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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues courts should apply a relatively liberal approach in 
deciding standing issues for private plaintiffs pursuing climate change suits, 
even if courts ultimately conclude that it is inappropriate to grant relief on 
the merits to those same plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has clearly declared 
that standing is a preliminary question that should be treated separately from 
decisions on the merits, and standing causation requires less proof than 
proximate causation on the merits. 1 The Supreme Court in its 2007 decision 
I. See infra Sections VI.A-B. This Article is one of a series of explorations of 
modem standing doctrines. The other pieces are: (I) Bradford Mank, Should States Have 
Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing 
Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; 
(2) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open 
Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. I (2009) [hereinafter Mank, 
Standingfor Private Parties in Global Warming Cases 871 
in Massachusetts v. EPA2 held that a state had standing under Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution to bring suit against the federal government for its 
failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that arguably cause 
global climate change, despite the highly diffuse and generalized nature of 
the harms involved, because states are "entitled to special solicitude in our 
standing analysis."3 Massachusetts did not directly address whether private 
parties have similar standing rights to bring climate change suits against the 
federal government or large private GHG emitters, but implied that private 
parties might have lesser standing rights when it declared that "[i]t is of 
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign 
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual."4 While there are im-
portant historical distinctions between standing in public and private rights 
cases, modem standing doctrine does not clearly distinguish between pri-
vate and public right cases, although courts sometimes make distinctions to 
a degree.5 Because the decision failed to address many distinctions between 
private and public rights in prior standing cases, the Massachusetts deci-
sion's invocation of special standing rights for states raised more questions 
than it answered about the standing rights of private parties in climate 
change cases. 6 
Because the Supreme Court has consistently treated Article III stand-
ing as a preliminary jurisdictional question that should be decided separate-
ly from decisions on the merits, this Article contends that courts in certain 
circumstances should recognize standing for private plaintiffs pursuing eli-
Standing and Future Generations]; (3) Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A 
Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing 
and Statistical Persons]; (4) Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects 
Probabilistic Standing, but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 
ENVTL. L. 89 (2010); (5) Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute's Misuse of Lyons's "Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
837 (2010); (6) Bradford C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for 
Future Standing Decisions, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10958 (2010); (7) Bradford Mank, Standing in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When 
Environmental Harm Is Difficult to Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 307 (2010); (8) Bradford C. 
Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. I (2012); (9) 
Bradford C. Mank, Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 543 (2012) [hereinafter Mank, Tea Leaves]; (10) Bradford 
C. Mank, Judge Posner's "Practical" Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer's Ap-
proach to Standing Than to Justice Scalia's, 50 Hous. L. REV. 71 (2012). 
2. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
3. !d. at 520. 
4. !d. at 518. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992), the 
Supreme Court concluded that Article III and possibly Article II of the Constitution limited 
Congress' authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete personal inju-
ry. 
5. See infra Section LB. 
6. Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56. 
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mate change suits even if courts ultimately conclude that it is inappropriate 
to grant relief on the merits to those same plaintiffs.7 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that there is a lower threshold for standing cau-
sation than for proximate causation on the merits,8 despite the argument of 
defendants and some academics that courts should use the more complicat-
ed and stringent proximate causation standard in standing decisions.9 In 
particular, Sections VI.A and VI.B will explain why standing is a prelimi-
nary question requiring a lesser amount of evidence and why standing cau-
sation should be treated as separate from proximate causation on the mer-
its.10 The desire of defendants for an efficient resolution of their case is not 
an appropriate basis for a court to distort the doctrine of standing even if the 
judge believes that the plaintiffs will be ultimately unsuccessful on the mer-
its, although courts may limit discovery and use other procedural methods 
to expedite resolution of the case on the merits} 1 Sections VI.C and VI.D 
demonstrate that courts should give greater preference to private suits seek-
ing damages and be less willing to accept private suits seeking injunctive 
relief, which are better addressed by sovereign state suits. 12 
Lower courts have divided regarding whether private parties have 
standing in climate change cases. In Connecticut v. American Electric Pow-
er Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that both the 
state plaintiffs and the private plaintiffs had standing to bring public nui-
sance actions against large electric utility companies that own power plants 
that emit significant amounts of GHGs because they demonstrated harm to 
coastal property they owned that was being inundated by rising sea levels 
caused by climate change. 13 By contrast, however, in Native Village of Ki-
valina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 14 the District Court for the Northern District of 
California concluded that the plaintiffs, the Village of Kivalina, whose in-
habitants are a self-governing, federally-recognized Tribe of Inupiat Eski-
mos, could not prove standing causation in a public nuisance action against 
7. See infra Section VI.A. 
8. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Ben-
net v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) and holding standing causation requires less proof 
than merits proximate causation), reh 'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 
607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane). See generally infra Section VI.B. 
9. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Stand-
ing, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1241, 1245-46, 1297-99 (2011) (arguing "the Court should refor-
mulate the causation prong of standing to clarify that standing requires a proximate cause, 
rather than a cause in fact, analysis" so that standing law can serve a gatekeeping function); 
see generally infra Section VI. B. 
10. See infra Sections VI.A-B. 
II. See infra Section V.D. 
12. See infra Sections VI.C, VI.D. 
13. 582 F.3d 309, 341-44 (2d Cir. 2009), rev 'd and remanded on other grounds, 131 
S. Ct. 2527,2540 (2011). 
14. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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several oil, energy, and utility companies for causing substantial GHG 
emissions that contribute to global warming. 15 The court found they could 
not trace the Village's harms to specific actions of the defendants in emit-
ting GHGs and that any possible connection was too attenuated to support 
standing.16 In 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal 
in Kivalina on the ground that the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs 
federal common law public nuisance claims, but did not address the stand-
ing issues. 17 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 18 the Supreme 
Court, by an equally divided vote of four to four, affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision finding standing and jurisdiction in the case. 19 The Court 
stated, "Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs 
have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to 
challenge EPA's refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions; and, further, that no 
other threshold obstacle bars review."20 The Court did not identify the 
"some plaintiffs," but commentators have speculated that the four justices 
affirming the Second Circuit's decision on standing may have agreed only 
that the state plaintiffs had standing.21 Again, as in Massachusetts, the Court 
did not directly address the standing rights of private plaintiffs. 22 
In a series of decisions involving Comer v. Murphy Oil, the District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and various judges on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have reached differing conclu-
sions on the standing rights of private plaintiffs in global warming litiga-
tion.23 The very complicated history of Comer will be discussed in Part V.24 
Most recently, after the plaintiffs refiled their complaint in Comer, the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that the private 
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.25 The Comer plaintiffs are appealing 
the district court's dismissal to the Fifth Circuit.26 Sections V.B, V.D, and 
15. Id. at 883. 
16. Id. at 878-81. 
17. Native Viii. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), 
petition for en bane review denied (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012). 
18. 131 s. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
19. See id. at 2535 & n.6; see also Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 590. 
20. Am. Electric Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citations omitted); see also Mank, 
Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 590. 
21. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 591-92. 
22. !d. at 599. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. See irifra Part VI. 
25. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858-62 (S.D. Miss. 
2012). 
26. Megan L. Brown & Roger H. Miksad, Global Warming Nuisance Suits Given a 
Cool Reception in Court, CLASS ACTION WATCH, June 20, 2012, at I, 9, available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20 120620 _ BrownMiksadCA W ll.l.pdf. 
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VI.B argue that a three-judge panel decision of the Fifth Circuit correctly 
determined that the plaintiffs had standing because there is a lower thresh-
old for standing causation than for proximate causation on the merits.27 
This Article proposes, in Sections VI.C and VI.D, criteria for address-
ing when it is appropriate to recognize standing for private parties filing 
suits involving climate change challenges.28 If a state plaintiff has articulat-
ed similar claims, the Massachusetts decision arguably implies that federal-
ist principles favor suits by sovereign states over duplicative private 
claims.29 That is especially true if the plaintiffs are seeking overlapping or 
duplicative injunctive relief.3° On the other hand, if plaintiffs like the Com-
ers have alleged unique injuries that no state plaintiff has asserted, then 
standing is presumptively appropriate if a plaintiff alleges a plausible con-
nection between its injuries and the defendant's actions, especially if the 
plaintiff is seeking individualized damages in a state common law nuisance 
action.31 The proposed approach by this Article suggests that courts should 
not recognize standing for private plaintiffs like those in the AEP decision 
who seek duplicative injunctive relief also sought by state plaintiffs, but that 
the Comer plaintiffs possibly should be able to prove standing if they pre-
sent plausible claims for individualized damages.32 
Part I discusses the basics of constitutional and prudential standing 
doctrines. Part II examines the Massachusetts decision's creation of a spe-
cial state standing doctrine in a climate case. Part III explores the Second 
Circuit's decision in AEP recognizing standing for both states and private 
parties and the possible implications of the Supreme Court's affirmance of 
that decision by an equally divided vote. Part IV summarizes the district 
court and Ninth Circuit decisions in Kivalina. Part V explains a district 
court's rejection of private party standing in Comer; a three-judge panel 
decision concluding the parties had standing; how the panel decision was 
vacated by the en bane Fifth Circuit; how the Fifth Circuit lost its quorum; 
and how the district court again rejected standing when the plaintiffs re-filed 
their complaint. Part VI argues that courts should decide standing separately 
from the merits, that standing causation requires a lower burden of proof 
than proximate causation on the merits, and the differences when private 
parties seek duplicative injunctive relief as opposed to individualized dam-
ages. 
27. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855,864 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g grant-
ed, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane); irifra 
Sections V.B, V.D and VI.B. 
28. See irifra Sections VI.C-D. 
29. See infra Section VI.C. 
30. See infra Section VI. C. 
31. See infra Section VI. D. 
32. See infra Sections VI.C-D. 
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I. STANDING BASICS33 
A. Constitutional Standing 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require a plaintiff to pos-
sess "standing" to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the Supreme Court 
has inferred from the Constitution's Article III limitation of judicial deci-
sions to "Cases" and to "Controversies" that federal courts must utilize 
standing requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genuine interest 
and stake in a case.34 "Those two words ['Cases' and 'Controversies'] con-
fine 'the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary 
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through 
the judicial process. "'35 The federal courts have jurisdiction over a case only 
if at least one plaintiff can prove standing for each form of relief sought. 36 A 
federal court must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff 
fails to meet the constitutional standing test.37 
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional principles. 
Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.38 Further-
more, standing requirements support separation of powers principles defin-
ing the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of 
33. The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles cited 
in footnote 1. 
34. Article III of the Constitution states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two 
or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of 
different States, between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explic-
itly the Article III standing requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time); Daim-
lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339-41 (2006) (explaining why Supreme Court 
infers that Article III's Case and Controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations). 
See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 1023, 1036-38 (2009) (discussing debate whether Constitution implicitly 
requires standing to sue). 
35. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 
u.s. 83, 95 (1968)). 
36. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 171 0; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing separately for each form of relief sought."). 
37. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e have an obligation to assure our-
selves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation."). 
38. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340. 
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government so that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-and proper-
ly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society. "'39 There is disagree-
ment, however, regarding to what extent separation of powers principles 
limit the authority of Congress to authorize standing to sue in federal courts 
for private citizens challenging alleged executive branch under-enforcement 
or non-enforcement of congressional requirements mandated in a statute.40 
For constitutional standing, the Court has used a three-part standing 
test that requires a plaintiff to show that: ( 1) she has "suffered an 'injury in 
fact,"' which is (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or immi-
nent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical"'; (2) "there must be a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has 
to be 'fairly ... trace[ able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not ... th[ e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not be-
fore the court"'; and (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'specula-
tive,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision. "'41 A plain-
tiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs of the standing test.42 This 
Article will focus on the second traceable causation prong because that 
prong is the most controversial in private climate change litigation.43 
B. Private Versus Public Standing Rights 
There are important historical distinctions between standing in public 
and private rights cases.44 "Under early English and American practice, a 
private individual could bring suit only to vindicate the violation of a pri-
vate, as opposed to a public, right."45 Under English common law, only the 
King or his agents could prosecute the alleged violation of public rights 
39. !d. at 339-41 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710. 
40. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) (conclud-
ing Article III and Article II of Constitution limit Congress's authority to authorize citizen 
suits by any person lacking a concrete injury), with id. at 602 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the "principal effect" of Justice Scalia's majority opinion's restrictive approach 
to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense -not of the 
courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates"). See also Heather 
Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L REv. 459, 496 (2008) (arguing courts should 
not use standing doctrine as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power"). 
41. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
42. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdic-
tion must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III"); LARRY W. 
Y ACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d ed. 2009). 
43. See Mary Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The Black 
Hole of Private Climate Change Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REv. 477, 481, 498-99, 510-17 
(2010). 
44. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 275, 279-86 (2008). 
45. !d. at 279. 
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such as the navigation of public waters or public highways.46 By contrast, 
beginning with the American Revolution through the nineteenth century, 
American courts typically followed the English rule that the violation of 
every private right carried a remedy, and therefore awarded nominal dam-
ages for violations of private rights that did not result in harm.47 
During the twentieth century, the relationship between public and pri-
vate law became more complicated, but there remained important distinc-
tions between the two categories.48 The government is still more likely to 
take a leading role in enforcing public rights;49 the discussion of the Massa-
chusetts decision in Part II will demonstrate that states have special rights to 
protect their natural resources. 50 But private individuals may now sue to 
vindicate constitutional or statutory rights in ways that pre-1900 courts 
would not have recognized. 51 
Standing doctrine originally developed from the principle that private 
parties could only enforce private rights and not public rights.52 Modern 
standing doctrine recognizes that private parties may enforce some types of 
public rights if a statute or constitutional provision creates a private right of 
action, a plaintiff has suffered a personal injury, and the suit does not violate 
separation of powers principles.53 Because current standing doctrine does 
not clearly distinguish between how litigants in private and public rights 
cases must meet the three-part standing test discussed above, there are many 
uncertainties about how standing principles apply, respectively, in public 
and private rights cases.54 Arguably, courts should apply a more lenient 
standing test in common law private rights suits against private defendants 
than in public rights suits against the government that raise separation of 
powers concerns.55 However, federal district court decisions in private eli-
46. /d. at 279-80. 
47. /d. at 284-86. 
48. See id. at 286-89. 
49. !d. at 286. 
50. See infra Subsection II.A.l. 
51. Hessick, supra note 44, at 286-89. 
52. /d. at 289. 
53. !d. at 289-90. 
54. !d. ("The consequence [of ignoring the distinction between public and private 
rights] has been the development of a confused and confusing body of [standing] law."); 
Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Fu-
ture Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1065, 1073 (2011) ("Despite its primary focus on 
the separation of powers as a justification for restrictive standing, the Supreme Court has 
never clearly distinguished private rights from public rights lawsuits for standing purpos-
es."). 
55. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (arguing that the 
private suit in Comer involved one less step than the federal regulation in Massachusetts), 
reh 'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en 
bane); Hessick, supra note 44, at 299-300, 310-17, 324-27 (arguing courts should not require 
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mate change tort suits, including Comer and Kivalina, have applied a strict 
standing causation standard to dismiss these cases. 56 
C. Prudential Standing 
In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements, federal 
courts may impose prudential standing requirements for various judicial 
policy reasons: 
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the stand-
ing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses "the general 
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring ad-
judication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the repre-
sentative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the 
zone of interests protected by the law invoked."57 
The Supreme Court's prudential standing doctrine is arguably more 
open to interpretation than its constitutional standing doctrine.58 Congress 
may enact legislation to override prudential limitations, but must "expressly 
negate" such limitations.59 
D. Generalized Grievances 
The Supreme Court has been unclear regarding whether its restriction 
on suits alleging "generalized grievances,"60 a term which courts sometimes 
use to refer to suits involving large segments of the public or to suits where 
a citizen who has no personal injury seeks to force the government to obey a 
duly enacted law, is a prudential limitation or a constitutional one.61 In Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc./2 for example, the 
proof of standing injury in private rights cases); Nagle, supra note 43, at 510-15 (criticizing 
strict standing causation in private climate suits as unwarranted in private rights cases). 
56. See supra Sections IV.A, V.D. 
57. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)). 
58. See id. ("[W]e have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the 
standing doctrine."); Bradford, supra note 54, at 1079 (describing prudential standing doc-
trine as "a malleable framework"). 
59. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997). 
60. YACKLE, supra note 42, at 342 ("The 'generalized grievance' formulation is 
notoriously ambiguous."); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized 
Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1863, 1884-92 (1996) 
("Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or pruden-
tial limitations, there is also uncertainty about their precise definition."). 
61. See Y ACKLE, supra note 42, at 342-45 (discussing debate in Supreme Court 
regarding if rule against generalized grievances is constitutional rule or non-constitutional 
policy waivable by Congress); Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1710-15; Solimine, 
supra note 34, at 1027 n.14. 
62. 438 u.s. 59 (1978). 
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Supreme Court held that a court could deny standing in a suit involving 
generalized harms to large numbers of the public because such a suit would 
raise "general prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly lim-
ited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'63 Subsequently, however, 
in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,64 the Court rejected the ar-
gument that plaintiffs seeking information that the government had a statu-
tory obligation to provide were barred from standing because they alleged a 
generalized grievance, since many other citizens were entitled to request the 
same information. 65 
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the government argued that 
the plaintiffs, who sought information from the Federal Election Commis-
sion because the information allegedly could assist their voting decisions, 
should not have standing because they had suffered only a generalized 
grievance common to all other voters.66 The Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the informational injury to the plaintiffs was too ab-
stract or generalized to constitute a concrete injury or that it violated judi-
cially imposed prudential norms against generalized grievances because the 
statute specifically authorized the right of voters to request information 
from the Commission and, therefore, overrode any prudential standing limi-
tations against generalized grievances.67 The Court distinguished prior cases 
that had applied judicially-imposed prudential norms against generalized 
grievances by reasoning that it would deny standing for widely shared, gen-
eralized injuries only if the harm is both widely shared and also of "an ab-
stract and indefinite nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for 
obedience to law. "'68 Akins stated that Article III standing was permissible 
even if many people suffered similar injuries as long as those injuries were 
concrete and not abstract.69 The Court declared that the fact that "an injury 
63. !d. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); Bradford C. 
Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. I, 21-
22 (2005). 
64. 491 u.s. 440 (1989). 
65. /d. at 449-50. 
66. 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998). 
67. /d. at 13-14, 19-21; Kimberly N. Brown, What's Left Standing? FECA Citizen 
Suits and the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 677, 678 (2007); Mank, Stand-
ing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
68. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-24. The Supreme Court has not been clear on whether 
generalized grievances pose a constitutional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue 
has been subject to much debate. Solimine, supra note 34, at 1027 n.14. The Akins decision 
implied that the rule against generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did not 
explicitly decide the issue. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25 (1998); accord Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances 
as prudential rule). 
69. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, 
at717. 
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is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest 
for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may 
count as an 'injury in fact. "'70 
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia argued that Article III 
prohibits all generalized grievances, even ones involving concrete injuries, 
because plaintiffs must demonstrate a "particularized" injury that "'affect[s] 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."'71 He contended that the 
Akins plaintiffs' alleged informational injury was an "'undifferentiated'" 
generalized grievance that was "'common to all members of the public"' 
and, therefore, that they must resolve it "by political, rather than judicial, 
means."72 More broadly, Justice Scalia dissented in Akins because he argued 
that generalized injuries to a large portion of the public are inherently un-
suitable for judicial resolution and must be addressed by the political 
branches of government, specifically the Executive Branch under both Arti-
cle III and the president's Article II "take care" authority to faithfully en-
force the nation's laws. 73 
II. MASSACHUSEITS V. EPA: PARENS PATRIAE STATE STANDING74 
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court concluded that the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA for failing to regulate 
GHGs emitted from motor vehicles allegedly causing climate change.75 No-
tably, the Court for the first time recognized that states have greater stand-
ing rights in some circumstances than other litigants pursuant to the parens 
patriae doctrine. 76 Because global warming affects everyone in the world, 
however, Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Massachusetts argued 
that states do not have greater standing rights than other litigants and also 
that the generalized injuries resulting from climate change are better ad-
dressed through the political process than the judiciary.77 
70. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, 
supra note 1, at 717. 
71. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 
I, at 7I8. 
72. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 
(1974)); accord Mank, supra note 63, at 39; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra 
note 1, at 718. 
73. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-37; Brown, supra note 67, at 702-03; Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 7I9. 
74. The discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA and parens patriae state standing in 
Part II is based on my earlier articles cited supra note I. 
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). 
76. /d. at 5I8-20; Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note I, at 68. 
77. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536-37, 546-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion on State Standing 
1. The Special Standing Rights of States 
The Massachusetts decision used the parens patriae doctrine as a jus-
tification for giving greater standing rights to states than other litigants. 78 
The parens patriae doctrine developed as an English common law doctrine 
regarding the authority of the English king to protect incompetent persons, 
including minors, the mentally ill, and mentally limited persons.79 Since the 
early twentieth century, federal courts have recognized that states may sue 
as parens patriae to protect their quasi-sovereign interests in the health and 
welfare of their citizens, as well as the natural resources available to them.80 
Relying upon the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens in his Mas-
sachusetts decision stated that "the special position and interest of Massa-
chusetts" was important in determining standing.81 He declared that "[i]t is 
of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign 
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual..'~82 Citing Justice 
Holmes' 1907 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. opinion, Which authorized 
Georgia to sue on behalf of its citizens because of the state's quasi-
sovereign interest in the state's natural resources and the health of its citi-
zens, the Massachusetts decision observed that the Court had long ago "rec-
ognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking 
federal jurisdiction."83 Justice Stevens concluded in the Massachusetts deci-
sion that "[j]ust as Georgia's independent interest 'in all the earth and air 
within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does 
Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory to-
day."84 Additionally, the Massachusetts court stated the fact that "Massa-
chusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affect-
ed,' which only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of 
78. /d. at 518-20 (majority opinion). 
79. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex ret. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 
(1982) (discussing briefly the history of the parens patriae concept); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note I, at 1756-57. 
80. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907); Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1757-58. 
81. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
82. /d. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992), the Supreme 
Court determined that Article III and possibly Article II of the Constitution circumscribed 
congressional authority to allow citizen suits by persons lacking a concrete individual injury. 
83. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19 (citing Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237-38 
(recognizing Georgia's independent interest in protecting its citizens from air pollution origi-
nating outside the state's borders)). 
84. /d. at 519 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237). 
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this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial 
power."85 
Further explicating the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens ex-
plained that states had standing to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in 
the health and welfare of their citizens because they had surrendered three 
crucial sovereign powers to the federal government: (1) states may no long-
er use military force; (2) the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating 
treaties with foreign governments; and (3) federal laws may in some cir-
cumstances preempt state laws. 86 Because states had surrendered these three 
sovereign powers to the federal government, the Court invoked the parens 
patriae doctrine to preserve the role for the states in a federal system of 
government by recognizing that states can file suit in federal court to protect 
their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of 
their citizens. 87 
Justice Stevens somewhat confusingly combined the parens patriae 
doctrine with other arguments for granting standing in Massachusetts, in-
cluding a procedural right conferred in the Clean Air Act (CAA) to chal-
lenge the EPA's decision to reject the plaintiffs' rulemaking petition.88 To 
support its conclusion that Massachusetts had the right to sue, the Court 
relied upon statutory language in the CAA to conclude that Congress had 
required the EPA to use the federal government's sovereign powers to pro-
tect states, among others, from vehicle emissions, "'which in [the Adminis-
trator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasona-
bly be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. "'89 Additionally, the 
Massachusetts decision observed that Congress has "recognized a concomi-
tant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as 
arbitrary and capricious. "9° Combining these justifications for standing with 
the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens concluded, "Given that proce-
dural right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign inter-
ests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis."91 A serious problem with the Massachusetts decision is that it did 
not clearly delineate to what extent the Court's recognition of special state 
standing rights resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to ei-
ther statutory rights in the CAA or the special standing rights of plaintiffs 
seeking to vindicate procedural rights.92 
85. /d. (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237). 
86. /d. 
87. /d. at 519-20. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(l) (2006)). 
90. /d. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (2006)). 
91. /d. 
92. Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticizing 
Massachusetts for not clarifying whether and to what extent the special treatment of state 
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2. Massachusetts Meets the Tests for Injury, Causation, and Redressa-
bility 
While it stated that states are entitled to a more lenient standing test 
pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine, the Court also arguably suggested 
that the Commonwealth had met the traditional three-part Article III stand-
ing test for injury, causation, and redressability.93 Regarding the injury 
prong of the standing test, the Court determined that climate change had 
caused rising sea levels that had already harmed Massachusetts' coastline 
and posed potentially more severe harms in the future. 94 Rejecting the prem-
ise that prudential or constitutional principles bar standing for any plaintiff 
seeking to challenge a generalized grievance,95 Justice Stevens stated, "That 
these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massa-
chusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation."96 Because Massachusetts 
"'owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal property,"' the Court con-
cluded that "[the Commonwealth] has alleged a particularized injury in its 
capacity as a landowner" even if many others have suffered similar inju-
ries.97 
Addressing the causation prong of the standing test, the Court con-
cluded that the "EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection 
between manmade [GHG] emissions and global warming."98 In light ofthe 
EPA's acknowledgement that man-made GHG emissions cause climate 
change, the majority opinion determined that "[a ]t a minimum, therefore, 
the EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions 'contribute[d]' to Massachu-
setts' injuries. "99 Nevertheless, the EPA "maintain[ ed] that its decision not 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes 
so insignificantly to petitioners' injuries that the Agency [could not] be 
haled into federal court to answer for them" since "predicted increases in 
[GHG] emissions from developing nations, particularly China and India, are 
likely to offset any marginal domestic decrease" that might result if the 
agency regulated GHGs from new vehicles. 100 
standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to the special 
standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate procedural rights or other factors). 
93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526. 
94. !d. at 521-23; Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1, at 71-73. 
95. See supra Section II.A (discussing whether prudential standing or constitutional 
standing principles restrict or prohibit suits alleging generalized grievances). 
96. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 ("[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely 
shared, the Court has found 'injury in fact."' (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11,24 (1998))). 
97. !d. (citations omitted). 
98. !d. at 523. 
99. !d. 
100. !d. at 523, 524. 
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The Court rejected the EPA's causation argument because it "rest[ed] 
on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is in-
cremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum." 101 Justice Ste-
vens observed that agencies and legislatures "do not generally resolve mas-
sive problems in one fell regulatory swoop."102 He concluded, "That a first 
step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal 
courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law."103 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that "reducing domestic automobile 
emissions is hardly a tentative step" because "the United States transporta-
tion sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere ... more than 1. 7 billion metric tons in 1999 alone."104 Because do-
mestic automobile emissions account for more than 6% of worldwide car-
bon dioxide emissions, the Court held that "U.S. motor-vehicle emissions 
make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and 
hence, according to petitioners, to global warming."105 
Finally, the EPA similarly argued that the plaintiffs could not satisfy 
the redressability portion of the standing test since federal courts could not 
remedy the alleged harms to the petitioners from GHGs because most emis-
sions come from other countries. 106 Rejecting the EPA's argument, the 
Court emphasized that the EPA had a duty to reduce future harms to Massa-
chusetts even if it could not prevent all such harms: "While it may be true 
that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global 
warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether 
EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it."107 Responding to the 
EPA's argument that its regulation of GHG emissions from new vehicles 
would have little impact because of increasing emissions from developing 
countries such as China and India, the Court stated: "A reduction in domes-
tic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter 
what happens elsewhere."108 Furthermore, the Court suggested that the EPA 
had a duty to prevent catastrophic harms to future generations: "The risk of 
catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be 
reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We there-
fore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge EPA's denial of their 
rulemaking petition."109 
I 0 I. !d. at 524. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. !d. 
105. !d. at 524, 525. 
106. !d. at 517, 523-24. 
107. Id. at 525. 
I 08. !d. at 525-26. 
109. !d. 
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Despite its assertion that states enjoy "special solicitude" in deciding 
standing questions, the Massachusetts decision's analysis of injury, tracea-
ble causation, and redressability requirements did not provide clear reasons 
for distinguishing between the standing rights of states and private plain-
tiffs.110 For example, a private land owner could suffer similar injuries as the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts alleged from rising sea levels. While the 
Court did mention that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts "'owns a sub-
stantial portion of the state's coastal property,"'111 there is no logical reason 
pursuant to standing requirements why an injury to a large amount of land 
should affect standing requirements differently from a similar injury to a 
small amount of land as long as both injuries are concrete. 112 The traceable 
causation and redressability issues in climate change cases arising from the 
fact that most emissions originate from outside the U.S. are arguably similar 
whether the plaintiffs are states or private parties. 113 
B. Chief Justice Roberts' Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the global 
problem of climate change was a nonjusticiable general grievance that 
should be decided by the political branches rather than the federal courts. 114 
He reasoned that it was inappropriate for the Court to apply a more gener-
ous standing test for states because there was no basis in the statute, prece-
dent, or logic for such a differentiation. 115 Furthermore, he contended that 
states do not have greater standing rights under the parens patriae doc-
trine.116 
1. The Parens Patriae Doctrine Does Not Provide Massachusetts with 
Greater Standing Rights 
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that Tennessee Copper treated states 
more favorably than private litigants, but he argued that the case did so 
"solely with respect to available remedies," giving Georgia the right to equi-
table relief when private litigants could obtain only a legal remedy. 117 He 
argued that "[t]he case had nothing to do with Article III standing."118 His 
point is technically correct because the Court did not develop the modern 
110. !d. at 520. 
111. !d. at 522 (citations omitted). 
112. See supra Subsection I.A.2 and Section I. C. 
113. See infra Section II.B. 
114. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
115. !d. at 536-40. 
116. !d. at 538-39. 
117. !d. at 537-38. 
118. !d. at 537. 
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standing doctrine until the 1940s, 119 but he did not address the implication in 
the majority opinion that broad standing rights for states would enhance 
their ability to enforce their quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the health 
of their citizens or their natural resources. 120 
Applying a narrow interpretation of the parens patriae doctrine, Chief 
Justice Roberts argued that a parens patriae suit could in no way lessen a 
plaintiff state's obligation to prove an injury, because "[a] claim of parens 
patriae standing is distinct from an allegation of direct injury," and "[f]ar 
from being a substitute for Article III injury, parens patriae actions raise an 
additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-sovereign 
interest' 'apart from the interests of particular private parties. "'121 Chief 
Justice Roberts contended that "a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as 
parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III" and that 
"[f]ocusing on Massachusetts' interests as quasi-sovereign makes the re-
quired showing here harder, not easier."122 
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court did not explain how its 
"special solicitude" for Massachusetts affected its standing analysis, "except 
as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on tradi-
tional terms."123 There is some merit to his criticism of the majority opinion 
because Justice Stevens never clearly explained to what extent the Court 
used "special solicitude" for Massachusetts' status as a state to change the 
Court's standing analysis. 124 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that "the status 
of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for petitioners' failure to 
demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability."125 He argued that 
the petitioners failed to prove that a causal connection existed between the 
alleged injury of loss of coastal land in Massachusetts and the lack of new 
motor vehicle GHG emission standards because "domestic motor vehicles 
[only] contribute about 6 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and 4 
percent of global [GHG] emissions."126 He concluded: "In light of the bit-
part domestic new motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have played in what 
petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the myriad addi-
tional factors bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the loss of Massachu-
119. See supra Section I. A. 
120. See supra Section II.A. 
121. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538. 
122. !d. 
123. !d. at 540. 
124. See Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticiz-
ing the Massachusetts decision for not clarifying whether and to what extent the special 
treatment of state standing in the case affected the result and how state standing doctrine 
might impact future cases). 
125. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540. 
126. !d. at 544. 
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setts coastal land-the connection is far too speculative to establish causa-
tion."127 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[r]edressability is 
even more problematic" for the plaintiffs in meeting their burden of proving 
standing because of the "tenuous link between petitioners' alleged injury 
and the indeterminate fractional domestic emissions at issue here," as well 
as the additional problem that the "petitioners cannot meaningfully predict 
what will come of the 80 percent of [GHG] emissions that originate outside 
the United States."128 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the majority's conclu-
sion that "any decrease in domestic emissions will 'slow the pace of global 
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere. "'129 He argued that 
the Court's reasoning failed to satisfy the three-part standing test's require-
ment that a court find that it is "likely" that a remedy will redress the "par-
ticular injury in fact" at issue in that case. 13° Chief Justice Roberts reasoned 
that "even if regulation does reduce emissions-to some indeterminate de-
gree, given events elsewhere in the world-the Court never explains why 
that makes it likely that the injury in fact-the loss of land-will be re-
dressed."131 
2. Chief Justice Roberts Argues the Case Is a Nonjusticiable General 
Grievance Better Suited for Resolution by the Political Branches 
Even granting the plaintiffs' assumption that climate change is a sig-
nificant policy problem, Chief Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion ar-
gued that it was a nonjusticiable general grievance that should be decided 
by the political branches rather than by the federal courts. 132 Initially, he 
asserted that the petitioners' injuries from global warming failed to meet 
Lujan's requirement that the alleged injury be "particularized" because they 
were common "to the public at large."133 Moreover, he contended that the 
Court's lax application of standing principles in this case failed to consider 
separation of powers principles, limiting the judiciary to "concrete cases."134 
He argued that the majority's recognition of standing in a case involving 
policy issues affecting the entire nation and the world at large caused the 
Court to intrude into policy decisions which are only appropriate for the 
127. !d. at 544-45. 
128. /d. at 545. 
129. /d. at 546. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
132. !d. at 535-36, 548-49. 
133. !d. at 539-41,543 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560, 
573-74 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
134. /d. at 539-40, 547. 
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political branches of government. 135 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the 
right of citizens to elect representatives to Congress and a President was an 
adequate answer to any sovereign rights that states had lost when they 
joined the United States, and, therefore, that there was no need for the Court 
to recognize liberal parens patriae standing rights for states to raise ques-
tions of quasi-sovereign interests in the federal courts. 136 Justice Roberts' 
dissenting opinion argued that only the political branches should decide 
issues involving generalized harms such as climate change, and, according-
ly, opposed the majority's recognition of state standing to bring parens pa-
triae suits to effectuate their alleged quasi-sovereign interests in protecting 
natural resources or citizens against generalized harms. 137 Clearly, Chief 
Justice Roberts would deny standing in climate change cases to both private 
and state plaintiffs because of his view that the generalized harms from a 
global issue should be addressed by the political branches and not Article III 
courts. 
III. CONNECTICUT V. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. 138 
A. The Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Action 
The Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. suit was filed before 
the Supreme Court's seminal Massachusetts decision in 2007. 139 In 2004, 
two groups of plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the Southern District of 
New York alleging that the five defendant electric power companies were 
committing a public nuisance by operating fossil-fuel burning electric gen-
erating plants in the United States that emitted large amounts of carbon di-
oxide that significantly contributed to global climate change. 140 Eight 
states141 filed the first complaint ("states plaintiffs"), and three nonprofit 
land trusts 142 filed the second complaint ("land trust plaintiffs"). 143 The de-
135. !d. at 535-36, 548-49. 
136. See id. at 535-36, 548-49 (arguing that the majority usurped the authority of 
political branches by unduly expanding standing rights of states). 
137. Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note I, at 76. 
138. The discussion of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. is based upon my 
prior article, Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I. 
139. See Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
140. !d. at 2533-34. 
141. California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Wisconsin, although New Jersey and Wisconsin withdrew by the time the case came 
before the Supreme Court. !d. at 2533-34 n.3. 
142. !d. at 2534 n.4. 
143. Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 & nn.2-3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev 'd, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev 'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2527,2540 (2011). 
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fendants were four private companies, 144 along with the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), "a federally owned corporation that operates fossil-fuel 
fired power plants in several States."145 "According to the complaints, the 
defendants 'are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United 
States."'146 Annually, the five utilities collectively emitted 650 million tons 
of carbon dioxide, which constituted "25 percent of emissions from the do-
mestic electric power sector, 10 percent of emissions from all domestic hu-
man activities, and 2.5 percent of all anthropogenic emissions world-
wide."147 
In their complaints, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants' carbon-
dioxide emissions worsened global climate change and thereby "created a 
'substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights,' in violation 
of [either] the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or, in the alterna-
tive, of state tort law."148 The states plaintiffs alleged that their "public 
lands, infrastructure, and [the health of their citizens] were at risk from cli-
mate change."149 The land trust plaintiffs alleged that "climate change would 
destroy habitats for animals and rare species of trees and plants on land the 
trusts owned and conserved."150 . Both the states plaintiffs and land trust 
plaintiffs each "sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant to cap its 
carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage 
each year for at least a decade.'' 151 As is discussed in Section VI.C, AEP 
would have presented even more interesting judicial issues if the land trust 
plaintiffs had sought a conflicting remedy different from the states, but the 
lawyers involved avoided difficult questions by seeking the same remedy. 152 
144. (1) American Electric Power Company, Inc. (and a wholly owned subsidiary); 
(2) Southern Company; (3) Xcel Energy, Inc.; and (4) Cinergy Corporation, which is now 
merged into Duke Energy Corporation. See Am. Electric Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 n.5; 
Duke Energy, Cinergy Complete Merger, (Duke Energy press release April 3, 2006) (an-
nouncing merger between Duke Energy and Cinergy), available at http://www.duke-
energy .com/news/releases/2006/apr/200604030 !.asp. 
145. !d. at 2534. 
146. !d. (quoting J.A. at 57, 118). 
147. !d. (citations omitted). 
148. /d. (quoting J.A. at 103-05, 145-47). 
149. /d. (citing J.A. at 88-93). 
150. /d. (citing J.A. at 139-45). 
151. /d. (quotingJ.A. at 110, 153). 
152. See id.; irifra Section VI.C. 
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B. The District Court Invokes the Political Question Doctrine 
In 2005, the District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed both suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions. 153 Invok-
ing separation of powers concerns, Judge Preska concluded that the com-
plex issue relating to whether and how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
from fossil-fuel burning power plants was a political question for resolution 
by the political branches and, therefore, not appropriate for judicial deci-
sion.154 Relying upon the six factor test in Baker v. Carr for determining 
what is a non-justiciable political question, 155 the district court concluded 
that a public nuisance suit seeking to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 
numerous electric power plants presented a non-justiciable political ques-
tion because of '"the impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. "'156 The 
court determined that the "identification and balancing of economic, envi-
ronmental, foreign policy, and national security interests" is a policy deter-
mination properly suited for resolution by the political branches and, there-
fore, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints. 157 
C. The Second Circuit Reverses and Allows an "Ordinary Tort Suit" to 
Proceed 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the district court. 158 The case was unusual in that it was argued in 
153. Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), rev'd, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 131 
S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011). 
154. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
155. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (establishing a six-factor test for when cases should be 
dismissed by courts because the case involves political questions). 
156. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267, 278 (2003)). The court explained that the plaintiffs' prayer for relief, requiring 
reductions of carbon dioxide from the plants over several years, was non-justiciable because 
making a decision would: 
require this Court to: (I) determine the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon 
dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate percentage 
reduction to impose upon Defendants; (3) create a schedule to implement those re-
ductions; (4) determine and balance the implications of such relief on the United 
States' ongoing negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change; 
(5) assess and measure available alternative energy resources; and (6) determine 
and balance the implications of such relief on the United States' energy sufficiency 
and thus its national security-all without an "initial policy determination" having 
been made by the elected branches. 
/d. at 272-73. 
157. /d. at 274 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278). 
158. Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315. 
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2006, but was not decided until 2009. 159 The long delay was likely caused in 
part by the Second Circuit's postponement of its decision until the Supreme 
Court decided Massachusetts, which the Second Circuit extensively dis-
cussed in its AEP decision. 160 Additionally, Judge Sonia Sotomayor was a 
member of the original three-judge panel of the Second Circuit until she 
was elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009. 161 The two remaining 
members of the panel decided the case on September 21, 2009, pursuant to a 
Second Circuit rule on that subject. 162 
Addressing the threshold jurisdiction questions, the court of appeals 
held that the suits were not barred by the political question doctrine163 and 
that all the plaintiffs' complaints met the Article III standing require-
ments.164 The Second Circuit rejected the district court and defendants' view 
that the complex issues involved in the case made it a non-judiciable politi-
cal question. The court stated that "federal courts have successfully adjudi-
cated complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century."165 
Crucially, the Second Circuit characterized the plaintiffs' suit as "an ordi-
nary tort suit" suitable for judicial resolution. 166 The court of appeals 
acknowledged that Congress by legislation or the Executive Branch by ap-
propriate regulations might in the future regulate power plant emissions of 
carbon dioxide and thereby displace the role of the judiciary under federal 
common law, but the court concluded that the political question doctrine did 
not bar the plaintiffs' suit because it was similar in its essential nature to 
other public nuisance cases that courts had handled in the past, even if cli-
mate change was a new issue. 167 The Second Circuit's discussion of stand-
ing will be examined in Section D below. 168 
Assessing the merits of the case, the Second Circuit held that all the 
plaintiffs had stated a claim pursuant to "the federal common law of nui-
sance."169 The court of appeals relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions 
holding that states may maintain suits to abate air and water pollution pro-
duced by other states or by out-of-state industry. 170 Since the EPA had not 
yet promulgated any rule regulating GHGs when it decided the AEP case, 
159. /d. at 310. 
160. !d. passim. 
161. /d.at314n.*. 
162. /d.at310,314n.*. 
163. Id. at 332. 
164. /d. at 349. 
165. /d. at 326. 
166. /d. at 329, 331. 
167. /d. at 332. 
168. See infra Section III.D. 
169. Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d at 371. 
170. See id. at 350-51 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); 
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)). 
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the Second Circuit concluded that the Act did not displace the plaintiffs' 
federal common law cause of action because the court could not "speculate 
as to whether the hypothetical regulation of [GHGs] under the Clean Air 
Act would in fact 'speak[] directly' to the 'particular issue' raised here by 
Plaintiffs."171 
D. The Second Circuit's Standing Analysis 
The district court's decision "explicitly declined to address Defend-
ants' standing arguments," reasoning in a footnote that "'because the issue 
ofPlaintiffs' standing is so intertwined with the merits and because the fed-
eral courts lack jurisdiction over this patently political question, I do not 
address the question of Plaintiffs' standing. "'172 Because it reversed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the case on political question grounds, the Second 
Circuit found it necessary to address whether the plaintiffs had standing to 
sue. 173 The court examined whether the states plaintiffs had parens patriae 
standing and concluded that any uncertainties in Massachusetts about the 
relationship between that standing doctrine and traditional Article III stand-
ing were irrelevant because the states plaintiffs met both tests. 174 The Sec-
ond Circuit also discussed whether the states and land trusts plaintiffs had 
Article III standing in their proprietary capacity as property owners. 175 The 
court then applied the three-part Article III standing test for (1) injury, (2) 
causation and traceability, and (3) redressability} 76 
Regarding the standing test for injury, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the states plaintiffs had adequately alleged current injury by demon-
strating increasing temperatures caused by rising levels of carbon dioxide 
had reduced the size of the California snowpack and thereby reduced the 
supply of freshwater in that state}77 Additionally, similar to the Massachu-
setts decision, the states also reasonably alleged future injury to their coastal 
lands from rising sea levels caused by climate change, despite the defend-
ants' argument that such injuries were not imminent, because there was 
171. !d. at 380 (quoting Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 
(1985)). 
172. !d. at 332 (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 
271 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 582 F.3d 309 (2009), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 2527,2540 (2011)). 
173. !d. at 332-47. 
174. !d. at 334-39. The Second Circuit did not address whether New York City had 
standing because once the court found that the states plaintiffs had standing it was not neces-
sary to decide the standing of the City since only one plaintiff need have standing for a suit to 
proceed. !d. at 339 n.17 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 
U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)). 
175. !d. at 339-40. 
176. !d. at 340-49. 
177. !d. at 341-42. 
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sufficient scientific evidence that rising sea levels would inevitably harm 
the states' coastlines and that such a certain injury was imminent even if it 
might not occur for years. 178 For the same reason, the land trust plaintiffs 
had adequately proven future harm to their properties from rising sea levels 
caused by increasing levels of carbon dioxide. 179 
Following the reasoning in Massachusetts, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the defendants' significant contribution as the five largest utility 
sources of GHGs in the U.S. was sufficient to establish causation and trace-
able injury for Article III standing, even though a majority of global GHG 
emissions come from other sources. 18° Furthermore, similar to the Comer 
panel decision's argument that traceable standing causation requires a lower 
amount of proof than proximate causation on the merits, which is discussed 
in Section VI.B, 181 the Second Circuit cited two courts of appeals decisions 
for the principle "that, particularly at the pleadings stage, the 'fairly tracea-
ble' standard is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation"; and there-
fore that the plaintiffs' allegations of harm from the defendants' power 
plants were sufficient to prove standing causation at this stage of the plead-
ings.'s2 
Regarding the redressability prong of the standing test, the defendants 
argued that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that their proposed rem-
edy of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from the defendants' power 
plants was likely to prevent global warming. 183 The Second Circuit conclud-
ed that the defendants' redressability arguments were foreclosed by the 
Massachusetts decision. 184 Following the reasoning in Massachusetts, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that it was 
likely that a court decision in their favor ordering reductions in carbon diox-
ide emissions from the defendants' power plants would slow or reduce the 
pace of global climate change even if it would not stop it entirely. 185 
In light of the Massachusetts decision, the Second Circuit's conclusion 
that the states plaintiffs had standing was understandable given the similari-
ties in the injuries alleged and commonalities in the causation and redressa-
bility in both cases. 186 More questionable was the Second Circuit's conclu-
sion that the private land trust plaintiffs had standing since the Massachu-
178. !d. at 342-44; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007). 
179. Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d at 342-44. 
180. !d. at 316, 345-47; see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-25. 
181. See infra Section VI.B. 
182. Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d at 345-47 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992); Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 
(11th Cir. 2006)). 
183. !d. at 348. 
184. !d. at 348-49 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26). 
185. !d. (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26). 
186. See supra Section III.A. 
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setts decision avoided addressing the standing rights of the private plaintiffs 
in that case and suggested that the states had greater standing rights than 
private parties. 187 The Second Circuit arguably should have avoided the con-
troversial issue of standing for the private plaintiffs since the injunctive 
remedies sought by the states and private land trust plaintiffs were the same. 
E. The Supreme Court's Standing Decision in AEP 
1. Summary of the Court's Standing Affirmance 
In almost all cases involving a tie vote, the Supreme Court simply an-
nounces that "[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."188 
The Supreme Court usually follows that formulaic response because an 
equally divided vote simply affirms the decision below without setting 
precedent for other lower courts outside that circuit. 189 In the AEP decision, 
however, the Court took the unusual step of providing some explanation of 
how it divided on the standing and other jurisdictional questions, although it 
did not announce the identities of the justices who voted for or against 
standing. 190 The Court stated: 
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this 
case. Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Arti-
cle III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA's 
refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other threshold obstacle 
bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in Mas-
sachusetts, or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of 
the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided 
Court, the Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits. 191 
187. Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American 
Electric Power v. Connecticut, CATO SuP. CT. REv. 295, 304-05, 311-12, 312 n.79 (Case 
Research Paper in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 2011-17, Sept. 2011) (arguing Second 
Circuit in AEP should not have addressed standing of private parties), available at 
http:/ /ssm.com/abstract= 1904541. 
188. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011) (per curi-
am). 
189. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Warming an EPA Worry, at First, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2011, 1 :31 PM), http:/ /www.scotusblog.com/20 11/06/opinion-
analysis-warming-an-epa-worry-at-first ("Because the Court split 4-4 on the right to sue 
issue, that part of the Second Circuit decision was left intact, but without setting a nationwide 
precedent."); Michael B. Gerrard, 'American Electric Power' Leaves Open Many Questions 
for Climate Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2011 (stating that the standing portion of the AEP 
case "did not set precedent in the technical sense"), available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP _NewYorkLawJourna 
I_ Gerrard_7.14.11.pdf. 
190. Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (20 11 ). 
191. !d. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520-26, 534-35 (2007); Nye v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 33,44 (1941)). 
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While technically not binding as a decision for the lower courts out-
side the Second Circuit, the AEP decision's four to four affirmance of the 
standing decision provides important clues as to how the Court is likely to 
rule in future standing cases, at least until the Court's membership changes 
because of future retirements or appointments to the Court. 192 
2. Who Were the Four Justices on Each Side of Standing in AEP? 
The voting in the Massachusetts decision offers the best guide as to 
how the eight justices voted in AEP. Five justices in the Massachusetts de-
cision voted that the Commonwealth had standing under the parens patriae 
doctrine and general Article III standing principles: Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 193 Three of these justices remained 
members of the Court when AEP was decided; most commentators have 
assumed that Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer voted in favor of 
standing in AEP, consistent with their endorsement of broad state standing 
principles in the Massachusetts decision.194 
Four justices dissented in the Massachusetts decision; joining Chief 
Justice Roberts' vigorous dissenting opinion arguing that standing was in-
appropriate in that case were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 195 These 
four justices remained on the Court at the time of the AEP decision. 196 
Again, the most logical presumption is that these four justices voted against 
standing in the AEP case as they had in the Massachusetts decision. 197 
By the time of the AEP decision, Justices Stevens and Souter had re-
tired from the Court and had been replaced by Justices Kagan and So-
tomayor, respectively. 198 Justice Elena Kagan was the only member of the 
Court who voted in AEP, but was not a member of the Court when Massa-
chusetts was decided. 199 Commentators have assumed that she voted in AEP 
with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer in part because it was unlikely 
that any of the dissenting justices in the Massachusetts decision changed 
their minds about standing for the AEP decision.200 Furthermore, in her brief 
192. Denniston, supra note 189; Gerrard, supra note 189. 
193. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 501, 526. 
194. Gerrard, supra note 189 ("Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly the four 
justices who find standing, and no other obstacles to review, are Justices Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Anthony Kennedy."). 
195. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
196. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME CT. OF THE 
U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
197. See Gerrard, supra note 189 ("The four who disagree [that there is standing in 
the AEP decision] are Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel Alito."). 
198. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 196. 
199. /d. 
200. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-36. 
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time on the Court, she has generally endorsed a permissive view of standing 
for plaintiffs201 and has most often voted with Justices Ginsburg and Brey-
er.202 Similarly, based on her permissive view of standing 203 and propensity 
to vote with the other justices appointed by U.S. presidents who belong to 
the Democratic Party/04 it is likely, although not certain, that Justice So-
tomayor would vote for state standing in cases similar to Massachusetts or 
AEP.2os 
3. The Impact of AEP on Future Standing Cases 
"Implicitly the AEP decision reaffirmed and even expanded [the 
Court's] standing analysis in Massachusetts, which recognized that states 
have special standing rights when they sue as parens patriae to protect their 
state's natural resources or the health of their citizens."206 Four justices con-
cluded that at least "some" of the AEP plaintiffs met Article III standing 
requirements in light of Massachusetts. 207 The "some plaintiffs" mentioned 
by the AEP decision were probably the states plaintiffs because the Massa-
chusetts decision only clearly endorsed standing rights for states to bring 
suits involving climate change.208 
The AEP decision "arguably adopted an even broader standing analy-
sis than Massachusetts by eliminating the requirement of a statutory proce-
dural right as a basis for standing."209 In AEP, the private petitioners' brief 
201. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1451-52 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kagan's dissenting opinion, 
arguing that taxpayers had standing to challenge Arizona's tuition tax credit. /d. 
202. During the Supreme Court's 2010-2011 term, Kagan voted with Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer in 91% and 85% of all cases, respectively. See SCOTUSBLOG, 
SCOTUSBLOG STAT PACK: OCTOBER TERM 2010, 1 (June 2011), available at 
http:/ /sblog.s3.amazonaws.cornlwp-content/uploads/20 11/06/SB _ OT I 0 _stat _pack _final. pdf. 
203. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1450-55. Justice So-
tomayor joined with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan-all appointed by Democratic Pres-
idents Clinton or Obama-in a dissenting opinion arguing that taxpayers had standing to chal-
lenge Arizona's tuition tax credit. See id.; Adler, supra note 187, at 313 (articulating that 
Justice Sotomayor is likely to side with judges with a permissive view of standing). 
204. Robert Barnes, Justices Who Will Shape Supreme Court's Future Pair Up, 
WASH. POST, June 29,2011, at A6-A7; SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 202, at 19. 
205. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 593-95; Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, 
Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1382 (2012), 
available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss4/5. 
206. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 545. 
207. Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 & n.6 (2011). 
208. See Adler, supra note 187, at 309-10; Gerrard, supra note 189 (suggesting the 
four justices in AEP who stated that at least "some plaintiffs" had standing were most likely 
referring to the states plaintiffs). 
209. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 545. See generally supra Section II.A 
(discussing Massachusetts' requirement of a statutory procedural right as a basis for stand-
ing). 
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had argued that the AEP plaintiffs could not meet the Article III constitu-
tional standing test because the broad standing principles in Massachusetts 
were limited to statutory cases.210 Because four justices concluded that some 
of the AEP plaintiffs had standing, these justices implicitly rejected the ar-
gument that Massachusetts' broad standing analysis applied in only statuto-
ry cases. Thus they appeared willing to extend Massachusetts' broad state 
standing principles beyond its original statutory setting.211 Accordingly, 
though it is technically not binding on future decisions, the AEP decision 
might lead to broader standing rights than Massachusetts. 212 
The four justices who concluded that at least some of the plaintiffs had 
Article III standing also observed that "no other threshold obstacle bars re-
view. "213 In footnote six of the AEP decision, the Court explained: "In addi-
tion to renewing the political question argument made below, the petitioners 
now assert an additional threshold obstacle: They seek dismissal because of 
a 'prudential' bar to the adjudication of generalized grievances, purportedly 
distinct from Article III's bar.'>214 Thus, four justices implicitly rejected the 
petitioners' argument that the political question doctrine or the prudential 
standing doctrine barred the plaintiffs' suit because it was a generalized 
grievance.215 Implicitly, by concluding that some of the AEP plaintiffs had 
standing and that no other threshold barriers barred their suit, the four jus-
tices refused to narrow the reach of the standing analysis in Massachusetts 
and arguably expanded standing rights beyond Massachusetts' statutory 
setting to common law cases. 216 
What remains uncertain is whether a majority of the Court would 
grant the same standing rights to private plaintiffs in climate change cases 
as it has for states in Massachusetts. It is unclear whether the four justices 
who voted for standing in AEP would support standing for private plaintiffs 
in a climate change case. During oral argument in Massachusetts, Justice 
Kennedy observed that the Tennessee Copper decision, which none of the 
briefs in the case had addressed, was the "best case" for the plaintiffs, and, 
therefore, the decision's recognition of special state standing rights under 
the parens patriae doctrine was arguably his idea. 217 Professor Gerrard 
speculates that when the language in the AEP opinion stating that "[flour 
members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article 
210. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 596. 
211. See Adler, supra note 187, at 313. 
212. !d. 
213. Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
214. !d. at 2535 n.6. 
215. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 590,596-98. 
216. !d. at 570-82, 597-98. 
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(No. 05-1120); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1738-40 ("It seems most 
likely that Justice Kennedy suggested that the majority rely on Tennessee Copper."). 
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III standing under Massachusetts"218 is "considered in conjunction with 
Massachusetts," one might infer "that Justice Kennedy believes that only 
states would have standing. Thus, there might be a 5-4 majority against any 
kinds of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG claims) by 
non-states."219 While Professor Gerrard's speculation about Justice Kenne-
dy's views on the standing rights of private plaintiffs in climate change suits 
might be correct, Part VI argues that the Court's standing principles support 
such suits, at least when private plaintiffs seek individualized damages for 
plausible concrete injuries from climate change.220 
IV. K1VAL/NA 221 
A. The District Court Dismisses for Lack of Standing 
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,222 the Village of 
Kivalina, whose inhabitants are a self-governing, federally-recognized tribe 
of Inupiat Eskimos, filed a public nuisance action against several oil, ener-
gy, and utility companies for causing substantial GHG emissions that con-
tribute to global warming.223 They alleged that the defendants' GHG emis-
sions 'and resulting climate change caused the melting of sea ice that had 
protected Kivalina from coastal storm waves and surges.224 They claimed 
growing storm surges resulting from climate change caused the erosion that 
was making Kivalina uninhabitable.225 The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result 
of the erosion, the Village would have to be relocated at a cost estimated to 
range from $95 to $400 million.226 Unlike the AEP plaintiffs who sought 
only injunctive relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs sought damages for the cost of 
relocating the village. 227 
In 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of California dis-
missed the Kivalina case on both political question and standing grounds. 
The district court concluded that the political question doctrine barred the 
suit because there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
218. Am. Electric Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
219. Gerrard, supra note 189. 
220. See infra Part VI. 
221. The discussion of the district court's decision in Kivalina is substantially based 
upon a prior article, but I have avoided using quotation marks when recycling material from 
that prior article to improve the readability of this Article. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 
599-601. The discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kivalina consists of completely 
new material. 
222. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
223. Id. at 868-69. 
224. !d. 
225. Id. at 869. 
226. !d. 
227. !d. 
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for a public nuisance suit addressing the complexities of global climate 
change.228 The court also determined that deciding the case would involve 
policy questions more appropriately resolved by the political branches of 
the government.229 Additionally, the district court concluded that the plain-
tiffs could not prove standing causation because they could not trace the 
Village's harms to specific actions of the defendants in emitting GHGs and 
because any possible connection was too attenuated to support standing.230 
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that they were entitled to 
special parens patriae standing rights pursuant to the Massachusetts deci-
sion because "[t]his rationale does not apply to Plaintiffs, which did not 
surrender its sovereignty as the price for acceding to the Union."231 Fur-
thermore, the district court concluded: 
Even if the special solitude mentioned in Massachusetts applied to Plaintiffs, they 
still would lack standing. As discussed above, Plaintiffs lack standing on the basis 
of the political question doctrine and based on their inability to establish causation 
under Article III. Even a relaxed application of the requisite standing requirements 
would not overcome these fatal flaws in Plaintiffs' case.232 
Because it had dismissed all of the federal common law claims, the 
district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 
law nuisance claims and, therefore, dismissed the state law claims without 
prejudice to their presentation in a state court action.233 
The district court's assertion in Kivalina that the plaintiffs could not 
prove causation even if the special standing rights in the Massachusetts de-
cision were applicable is inconsistent at least with the reasoning of the four 
justices who found standing in the subsequent AEP decision. 234 The private 
petitioners in their AEP brief made essentially the same argument as the 
Kivalina district court decision in arguing that the plaintiffs could not estab-
lish standing causation when the defendants had caused only a tiny fraction 
of the worldwide GHG emissions contributing to climate change,235 but four 
justices in the AEP decision concluded that the plaintiffs had met Article III 
constitutional standing requirements despite similar contrary causation ar-
gurnents.236 
Additionally, it remains to be seen whether other courts will accept the 
reasoning in the district court's Kivalina decision that the state standing 
228. !d. at 873-77. 
229. /d. 
230. /d. at 877-81. 
231. /d. at 882. 
232. /d. 
233. /d. at 882-83. 
234. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note I, at 600. 
235. /d. at 600-01. 
236. /d. at 60 I. 
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doctrine is inapplicable to a federally-recognized tribe.237 Neither Massa-
chusetts nor the AEP decision addressed the standing rights of tribes or pri-
vate plaintiffs.238 Eventually, the Supreme Court may need to address 
whether non-state parties, including either tribes or private parties, can file 
suit for harms caused by globalized problems such as GHG emissions. 
Furthermore, the district court's causation analysis in Kivalina was 
flawed because it failed to distinguish between the lower standard for trace-
able standing causation and the higher standard for proximate causation for 
a merits determination. As is discussed in Sections V.B, V.D, and VI.B, the 
three-judge panel in Comer appropriately recognized, consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent, that there is a lower threshold for standing causation 
than for causation on the merits.239 The panel correctly concluded that the 
Comer plaintiffs had alleged sufficient· facts about the connection between 
climate change and the possibly amplified impact of Hurricane Katrina to 
meeting standing requirements, even if one might doubt that they could 
prove proximate causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 240 Similarly, 
the district court in Kivalina should have recognized that the Village had 
asserted sufficient facts to establish standing causation, even if the judge 
doubted the ability of the plaintiffs to prevail on the merits. As is discussed 
in Section VI.B, courts, in deciding standing causation issues, should simply 
look for plausible evidence of a causal relationship between the plaintiff's 
injuries and the defendant's actions, rather than the proof necessary for 
proximate causation on the merits.241 
237. Some lower court decisions and commentators have implicitly or explicitly 
accepted parens patriae standing for Native American Indian tribes. See Berrey v. Asarco, 
Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 640-41 n.l (lOth Cir. 2006) (accepting implicitly Quapaw Tribe's stand-
ing as parens patriae in suit under both common law and federal statutes against mining 
company that allegedly caused environmental contamination on tribal lands); Quapaw Tribe 
of Oklahoma v. Blue Tee Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1181 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (holding 
explicitly that tribe has parens patriae standing); Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, Un-
guarded Indians: The Complete Failure of the Post-Oliphant Guardian and Dual-Edged 
Nature of Parens Patriae, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1119-20, 1159-62 (supporting parens 
patriae standing for Indian Tribes as means to "restore their inherent sovereignty and finally 
provide the necessary protection for tribal members"); Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Effective Ac-
cess to Justice: Applying the Parens Patriae Standing Doctrine to Climate Change-Related 
Claims Brought by Native Nations, 32 PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 8-25 (2011) 
(criticizing Kivalina district court for rejecting parens patriae standing for Native Village of 
Kivalina and supporting parens patriae standing for Indian Tribes). 
238. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note 1, at 601. 
239. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted), reh 'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en bane); see also Sections V.B, V.D and VI. B. 
240. Comer, 585 F.3d at 864-65; see infra Section VI.B. 
241. Comer, 585 F .3d at 864. 
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Kivalina 
1. The Panel Majority Holds the CAA Displaces the Plaintiffs' Feder-
al Common Law Claims, but Does Not Address Standing 
After the parties submitted supplemental appellate briefs relating to 
the Supreme Court's AEP decision, a Ninth Circuit panel heard oral argu-
ment in Kivalina in November 2011.242 In their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 
the Kivalina plaintiffs argued that their federal common law claims are not 
displaced by the Clean Air Act (CAA) because damages claims are inher-
ently different from the injunction claims displaced in AEP; however, the 
defendants argued that all federal common law clai.ms are displaced by the 
CAA.243 The Kivalina plaintiffs also contended that their state common law 
nuisance claims were not properly "'before [the Ninth Circuit] because the 
district court dismissed them without prejudice to re-filing in state court. "'244 
In 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in Ki-
valina on the ground that the CAA displaced the plaintiffs' federal common 
law public nuisance claims; the panel did not, however, address the standing 
issues. 245 First, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in AEP 
had clearly held that the CAA displaces federal common law nuisance suits 
seeking to abate GHG emissions from stationary sources such as electric 
power plants.246 Secondly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that their federal common law suit for damages was fundamentally different 
from the injunctive suit displaced in AEP.247 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that a line of Supreme Court decisions barred all remedies, including dam-
ages, if the Court determined that a federal common law cause of action was 
displaced by a comprehensive statute.248 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
242. Brown & Miksad, supra note 26, at 8. 
243. See id; Appellants' Supplemental Brief on AEP v. Connecticut at 3-8, Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-17490) 
[hereinafter Kivalina Supplemental Brief]. 
244. Kivalina Supplemental Brief, supra note 243, at I n.2; Brown & Miksad, supra 
note 26, at 8. 
245. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 
2012), petition for en bane review denied (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012). 
246. /d. at 856-57. 
247. /d. at 857. 
248. The Ninth Circuit in Kivalina stated: 
[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that the type of remedy asserted is not relevant 
to the applicability of the doctrine of displacement. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, Exxon asserted that the Clean Water Act preempted the award of maritime 
punitive damages. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that it had "rejected simi-
lar attempts to sever remedies ftom their causes of action." In Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea C/ammers Ass 'n, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a public nuisance claim of damage to fishing grounds caused by discharges 
and ocean dumping of sewage. The Court held that the cause of action was dis-
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Supreme Court's approach, reasoning: "If a federal common law cause of 
action has been extinguished by Congressional displacement, it would be 
incongruous to allow it to be revived in another form."249 The panel con-
cluded: 
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional action. That deter-
mination displaces federal common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, 
as well as those actions seeking injunctive relief. The civil conspiracy claim falls 
with the substantive claim. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
We need not, and do not, reach any other issue urged by the parties.250 
2. Judge Pro's Concurring Opinion Holds the Plaintiffs Lack Stand-
ing, but Suggests that Their State Common Law Claims May Be 
Pursued in State Court 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Pro, a federal district court judge 
from the District of Nevada sitting by designation, filed a separate opinion, 
part of which states: 
[T]o address what I view as tension in Supreme Court authority on whether dis-
placement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily calls for displacement of a 
damages claim, and to more fully explain why I concur in the majority opinion's 
ultimate conclusion. I also write separately to express my view that Kivalina lacks 
standing?51 
In a lengthy discussion of the relevant cases, Judge Pro questioned 
whether all of the Supreme Court's displacement cases had consistently 
barred both injunctive and damages remedies.252 Nevertheless, he concluded 
that "Milwaukee II, Middlesex, AEP, and the comprehensive nature of the' 
CAA lead to the conclusion that Kivalina's federal common law nuisance 
claim for damages in this case is displaced.m53 
For the purposes of this Article, Judge Pro's complicated argument 
that the Supreme Court's displacement cases had not consistently barred 
both injunctive and damages remedies is less important than his discussion 
of a case in which the Supreme Court had concluded that a federal statute 
that preempted state injunctive relief did not necessarily bar a state legal 
placed, including the damage remedy. Thus, under current Supreme Court juris-
prudence, if a cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all reme-
dies. 
!d. (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)) (citing Middlesex Cnty. 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'I Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981)). 
249. !d. 
250. !d. at 858. 
251. !d. (Pro, J., concurring). 
252. !d. at 858-66. 
253. !d. at 866. 
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action for damages.254 In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the Court held that 
federal law preempted a state law claim for injunctive relief because federal 
statutes give the federal government exclusive authority for the safety of 
nuclear facilities; the Court also concluded that federal law did not preempt 
the plaintiff's state law damages claim.255 Judge Pro reasoned, "Consequent-
ly, Silkwood supports the conclusion that the right and the remedy may in-
deed be severed when the particular claim at issue seeks injunctive relief 
versus damages."256 
Even if the Ninth Circuit is correct that the CAA displaces the Ki-
valina plaintiffs' federal common law remedy, Judge Pro's reasoning clear-
ly suggests that they may still seek damages through a state common law 
action. 257 Judge Pro explicitly observed: 
Displacement of the federal common law does not leave those injured by air pollu-
tion without a remedy. Once federal common law is displaced, state nuisance law 
becomes an available option to the extent it is not preempted by federal law .... 
The district court below dismissed Kivalina's state law nuisance claim without 
prejudice to refiling it in state court, and Kivalina may pursue whatever remedies it 
may have under state law to the extent their claims are not preempted.258 
Unlike the panel majority decision, Judge Pro addressed the issue of 
whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue because he viewed standing as a 
jurisdictional issue that plaintiffs have the burden of establishing before a 
court may consider the merits of a case.259 Judge Pro argued that the plain-
tiffs had failed to prove traceable standing causation because they had failed 
to show that the defendant-appellees had caused their specific injuries when 
many other actors who were not parties to the suit had contributed to the 
global problem of GHG emissions over hundreds of years, since GHG 
emissions remain in the Earth's atmosphere for long periods of time.260 
Judge Pro distinguished the facts in Massachusetts from those in Kivalina: 
It is one thing to hold that a State has standing to pursue a statutory procedural 
right granted to it by Congress in the CAA to challenge the EPA's failure to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions which incrementally may contribute to future global 
warming. It is quite another to hold that a private party has standing to pick and 
254. See id. at 863. 
255. Id. (discussing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250-51, 256 
(1984) (concluding that the federal statute preempted state injunctive remedies, but did not 
preempt state damage remedies)). 
256. Id. at 863. 
257. Id. at 866-67. 
258. I d. at 866 (citing Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 
(2011) ("In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the 
availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the 
federal Act.")). 
259. Id. at 867-69. 
260. Id. at 868-69. 
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choose amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout history to hold liable 
for millions of dollars in damages.261 
Judge Pro failed to address that four Supreme Court justices in AEP 
would have recognized the right of at least state plaintiffs to have standing 
to file a non-statutory common law action that in effect "pick[ ed] and 
[chose] amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout history" to seek 
injunctive relief, although not damages.262 Furthermore, he did not address 
whether the Village of Kivalina was a tribal entity that possessed rights akin 
to states.263 It is possible that the Supreme Court may agree with Judge Pro 
that private plaintiffs may not bring common law actions for damages 
against a selective group of defendants, but his short opinion on standing 
did not address all of the complexities involving private party GHG suits 
raised in this Article.264 His two colleagues implicitly chose not to join his 
views on standing. 265 
V. COMER V. MURPHY OIL 
In several decisions involving Comer v. Murphy Oil, the District Court 
for the Southern District of Mississippi and various judges on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have disagreed regarding whether 
private plaintiffs in global warming litigation have standing to sue. 266 In the 
most recent Comer decision, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi reviewed Massachusetts, AEP, and the district court's decision 
in Kivalina, and held that the private plaintiffs did not have standing to 
sue/67 although the plaintiffs have appealed that decision to the Fifth Cir-
cuit.268 Parts V.D and VI.B conclude, however, that a three-judge panel de-
cision of the Fifth Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because 
there is a lower threshold for standing causation than for proximate causa-
tion on the merits, provided better reasoning than the district court decision 
denying standing.269 
261. !d. at 869. 
262. Compare id. with Section III. E. 
263. See infra Section N.A. 
264. See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
265. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858 (majority opinion) ("We need not, and do not, reach 
any other issue urged by the parties."). 
266. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 
6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev'd in part, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 
2009), reh'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en bane). The case was re-filed in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 
849 (S.D. Miss. 2012); see infra Part VI. 
267. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 858-62. 
268. Brown & Miksad, supra note 26, at 1, 9. 
269. See Comer, 585 F.3d at 864; see infra Sections V.B, V.D. and VI.B. 
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A. Background to the Comer Case 
In 2005, Ned and Brenda Comer, as well as other plaintiffs, filed suit 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against a group 
of oil companies alleging that the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas-
es emitted from the fossil fuels that they sold increased global warming, and 
that this warming caused or exacerbated Hurricane Katrina, which damaged 
their property.270 Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a third amended com-
plaint that added claims against several electric utility companies, chemical 
manufacturers, and coal companies.271 The third amended complaint assert-
ed several claims seeking compensatory and punitive damages based on 
Mississippi common law related to the plaintiffs' contentions that the de-
fendants' GHG emissions had exacerbated the harms they allegedly suffered 
during Hurricane Katrina. 272 The plaintiffs' claims in the third amended 
complaint included unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy and aiding and abet-
ting, public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, and fraudulent mis-
representation and concealment. 273 
In 2007, the district court conducted a hearing concerning the coal 
companies' motion to dismiss.274 The court held that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing to bring the lawsuit "because their injuries were not fairly 
traceable to the actions of the defendants."275 The court also held that the 
plaintiffs' claims were non-justiciable pursuant to the political question doc-
trine. 276 Because it held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear any of the 
plaintiffs' claims, the court entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' 
claims.277 The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their 
claims.278 
270. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 852. The plaintiffs also alleged that a group of insur-
ance companies wrongfully denied insurance coverage. !d. This Article will not address the 
insurance claims. 
271. !d. at 852. 
272. !d. at 852-54. 
273. !d.; Comer, 585 F.3d at 859-60; Bradford C. Mank, Civil Remedies, in GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 183, 201-04 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (discussing 
allegations in Third Amended Complaint in Comer). 
274. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 
6942285, at *I (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev'd, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009), 
reh'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc).The district court did not issue a written opinion in the case, but instead explained its 
ruling from the bench. !d. 
275. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (citation omitted). 
276. !d. 
277. !d. 
278. !d. 
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B. Three-Judge Panel Recognizes Standing for the Private Plaintiffs 
In 2009, a Fifth Circuit panel of three judges reversed in part the dis-
trict court's dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert 
their public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims, and that 
none of these claims present non justiciable political questions.279 The panel 
determined, however, that "their unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, and civil conspiracy claims must be dismissed for prudential standing 
reasons.mso As is discussed in more detail below in Section V.C, the Fifth 
Circuit granted a rehearing en bane that vacated the panel opinion and 
judgment. 281 Then, because new circumstances arose that led a judge to dis-
qualify and recuse himself, the Fifth Circuit lost the necessary quorum to 
hear an en bane appeal and concluded that it could not hear the case, leaving 
the district court's decision as the final decision in the case.282 Even though 
the panel decision was vacated and has no legally binding effect, it certainly 
is worthwhile to consider how three members of the Fifth Circuit evaluated 
a private plaintiffs claim of standing in a climate change case. 
Because the case was a diversity action involving state common law 
rights of action, the panel observed that the plaintiffs had to satisfy both 
state and federal standing requirements.283 The panel observed that Missis-
sippi's courts have been more permissive than federal courts in granting 
standing to parties because the state constitution does not limit the judicial 
power to "Cases" or "Controversies."284 The panel concluded that the plain-
tiffs had standing under Mississippi law because they "clearly allege that 
their interests in their lands and property have been damaged by the adverse 
effects of defendants' greenhouse gas emissions."285 
The panel initially observed that federal courts apply "more rigorous" 
standing requirements than Mississippi courts because of Article III's "Cas-
es" and "Controversies" limitation on the federal judiciary.286 After review-
ing the standing requirements discussed in Part I of this Article, the panel 
concluded that "the plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the first and third consti-
tutional minimum standing requirements" for their nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence claims.287 The panel explained, "These state common-law tort 
claims, in which plaintiffs allege that they sustained actual, concrete injury 
279. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860. 
280. /d. 
281. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane); see 
infra Section V.C. 
282. Comer, 607 F.3d at 1053-55. 
283. Comer, 585 F.3d 855 at 861-62. 
284. /d. at 862. 
285. /d. 
286. !d. 
287. /d. at 863. 
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in fact to their particular lands and property, can be redressed by the com-
pensatory and punitive damages they seek for those injuries."288 
The panel observed that the defendants only challenged the second 
prong of standing-whether the harms alleged by the plaintiffs are fairly 
traceable to the defendants' actions.289 The defendants argued that the plain-
tiffs' theory tracing their injuries from Hurricane Katrina to defendants' 
actions in selling products containing GHGs was too attenuated to meet the 
traceable causation prong of standing.290 The panel, however, rejected the 
defendant's argument because it "essentially calls upon us to evaluate the 
merits of plaintiffs' causes of action," and therefore was "misplaced at this 
threshold standing stage of the litigation."291 
The panel reasoned that the traceable causation requirement for Arti-
cle III standing '"need not be as close as the proximate causation needed to 
succeed on the merits of a tort claim. Rather, an indirect causal relationship 
will suffice, so long as there is a fairly traceable connection between the 
alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. "'292 The pan-
el's reasoning that the traceable standing causation requirement may be 
satisfied with less evidence than is necessary to prove proximate causation 
on the merits is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Bennett v. 
Spear, which stated that the "'proximate cause' of ['plaintiffs'] harm' was 
not equivalent with the 'injury "fairly traceable" to the defendant' for stand-
ing purposes."293 In Bennett, the government defendant argued that the peti-
tioners had to prove proximate causation to prove traceable causation, but 
the Court rejected that argument by stating that "[t]his wrongly equates inju-
ry 'fairly traceable' to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's 
actions are the very last step in the chain of causation. "294 Section VI.B will 
agree with the panel decision, as well as Bennett, and explain why standing 
288. /d. 
289. !d. at 864. 
290. !d. at 863-64. 
291. !d. at 864. 
292. !d. (quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. ofReadington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
293. /d. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997) (internal citations 
omitted)); see also Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315,324 (4th Cir. 
2002) ("[T]he 'fairly traceable' standard is 'not equivalent to a requirement of tort causa-
tion."' (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 
1992))); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 
200 I) ("[W]e have never applied a 'tort' standard of causation to the question of traceabil-
ity."); but see Meier, supra note 9, at 1241, 1245-46, 1297-99 (arguing "the Court should 
reformulate the causation prong of standing to clarify that standing requires a proximate 
cause"). 
294. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168-69; Meier, supra note 9, at 1263-64 ("The Court reject-
ed the proximate cause argument of the Service because the plaintiffs had, in the Court's 
mind, satisfied the cause in fact analysis."). 
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causation should be treated as separate from proximate causation on the 
merits.295 
In light of the procedural status of the case, in which the defendants 
had filed a motion to dismiss that did not allow them to challenge the factu-
al allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint,296 the panel concluded, as had the 
Second Circuit in AEP,297 that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient facts to 
establish traceable causation for standing at the pleadings stage, even if they 
might need to allege additional facts to prove their case on the merits at a 
later time. The panel stated, "Plaintiffs' complaint, relying on scientific re-
ports, alleges a chain of causation between defendants' substantial emis-
sions and plaintiffs' injuries, and while plaintiffs will be required to support 
these assertions at later stages in the litigation, at this pleading stage we 
must take these allegations as true."298 Sections VI.A and VI.B will argue 
that the panel was correct in distinguishing between the level of proof nec-
essary to establish the preliminary question of standing and the amount of 
proof needed to succeed on the merits in a public nuisance or other tort 
claim against defendants for emitting GHGs in a climate change suit.299 
The panel observed that the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs 
had failed to prove traceable standing causation was similar to arguments 
rejected in Massachusetts. 300 The panel stated, "Essentially, [the defendants] 
argue that traceability is lacking because: (1) the causal link between emis-
sions, sea level rise, and Hurricane Katrina is too attenuated, and (2) the 
defendants' actions are only one of many contributions to greenhouse gas 
emissions, thereby foreclosing traceability."301 Yet the Massachusetts deci-
sion had "accepted as plausible the link between man-made greenhouse gas 
emissions and global warming."302 Furthermore, in a footnote, the Massa-
chusetts opinion had even suggested that global warming might have exac-
erbated Hurricane Katrina. 303 The panel reasoned that Massachusetts had 
"accepted a causal chain virtually identical in part to that alleged by [the] 
plaintiffs [in Comer], viz., that defendants' greenhouse gas emissions con-
tributed to warming of the environment, including the ocean's temperature, 
295. See infra Section VI .B. 
296. Comer, 585 F.3d at 864; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12. 
297. See Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345-47 (2d Cir. 
2009), rev 'd and remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (20 II); supra Section 
III. D. 
298. 
299. 
300. 
301. 
302. 
303. 
Comer, 585 F.3d at 864; Am. Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 345-47. 
See infra Sections VI.A-B. 
Comer, 585 F.3d at 865; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007). 
/d. 
/d. (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523). 
/d. at 865 n.4 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 n.l8). 
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which damaged plaintiffs' coastal Mississippi property via sea level rise and 
the increased intensity of Hurricane Katrina."304 
Additionally, the panel argued that causation in Comer involved one 
less step than Massachusetts, which included the additional causation step 
of the EPA's failure to regulate GHGs.305 Because Comer had one less cau-
sation step than Massachusetts, the panel reasoned that "these plaintiffs 
need no special solicitude" in the standing analysis, in contrast to the special 
solicitude that the Massachusetts decision applied to the standing of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.306 Accordingly, the panel concluded that 
the private plaintiffs in its climate change case could prove standing without 
the special solicitude granted to states in Massachusetts. 307 
Furthermore, the panel rejected the defendants' argument that the 
plaintiffs could not prove traceable standing causation because the defend-
ants contributed only a small portion of total global GHG emissions, mirror-
ing the Massachusetts decision, which rejected the EPA's argument that 
domestic new vehicle emissions were too small a contribution to global 
climate change to justify standing causation.308 The panel explained that the 
Massachusetts opinion had "recognized, in the same context as the instant 
case, that injuries may be fairly traceable to actions that contribute to, rather 
than solely or materially cause, greenhouse gas emissions and global warm-
ing."309 Additionally, the panel relied on a treatise summarizing standing 
cases for the principle that the '"fact that the defendant is only one of sever-
al persons who caused the harm does not preclude a finding of causation 
sufficient to support standing. "'310 The panel then cited cases from several 
federal courts of appeals, agreeing that a plaintiff can prove traceable stand-
ing causation by showing that a defendant probably contributed to the plain-
tiffs injury without proving the precise harm caused by the defendant's 
pollutants to the plaintiff.3'' The panel concluded by holding that the allega-
304. !d. at 865 
305. !d. at 865 n.5. 
306. !d. 
307. !d. 
308. !d. at 865-66. 
309. !d. at 866. 
310. !d. (quoting 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
101.41[1] (3d ed. 2008) (citing Lac Du Flambeau Band v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490,500-01 (7th 
Cir. 2005))). 
311. !d. at 866-67 ((quoting Save Our Cmty. v. U.S. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 
1996); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (en bane)) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 
n.7 (4th Cir. 1992); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 995 
(9th Cir. 2000); Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 
207 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 2000); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum 
Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1996); Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell 
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tions in the plaintiffs' complaint that the defendants' GHG emissions had 
resulted in personal injury to the plaintiffs in violation of Mississippi's tres-
pass, private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence laws had satisfied 
federal standing requirements, including that of traceable causation.312 
On the other hand, the panel concluded that the plaintiffs' second set 
of claims-involving allegations of unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, and civil conspiracy--did "not satisfy federal prudential standing 
requirements" because they involved generalized grievances.313 The panel 
stated, "Each of the plaintiffs' second set of claims presents a generalized 
grievance that is more properly dealt with by the representative branches 
and common to all consumers of petrochemicals and the American pub-
lic."314 The panel explained that the plaintiffs' first set of claims alleged 
particularized injuries causing individualized harms to each plaintiffs prop-
erty, and, therefore, these allegations met federal standing requirements. 315 
By contrast, the second set of claims in the plaintiffs' complaint essentially 
alleged that the government failed to properly enforce environmental laws, 
affecting the public at large because of "the defendants' engagement in an 
allegedly false public marketing campaign and wrongful dissuasion of gov-
ernment regulation."316 In light of prudential standing doctrine, the panel 
concluded that the second set of claims in the plaintiffs' complaint alleging 
fraud by the defendants included generalized grievances inappropriate for 
judicial decision and better suited for resolution by the political branches, 
since the "interests at stake involve[ d] every purchaser of petrochemicals 
and the entire American citizenry because the plaintiffs [were] essentially 
alleging a massive fraud on the political system resulting in the failure of 
environmental regulators to impose proper costs on the defendants."317 
In a specially concurring opinion, Judge Davis agreed with the panel 
opinion that the plaintiffs had satisfied standing requirements and that the 
case should not be dismissed pursuant to the political question doctrine.318 
As "an alternative basis for dismissal," however, he agreed with the defend-
ants "that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under common law" because 
"the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that could establish that the defendant's 
Dufftyn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990); Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Cnty. 
Comm'rs of Carroll Cnty., Md., 268 F.3d 255,263-64 (4th Cir. 2001); Am. Canoe Ass'n v. 
City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm'n, 389 F.3d 536, 543 (6th Cir. 2004); Loggerhead 
Turtle v. Cnty. Council ofVolusia Cnty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998))). 
312. See id. at 860, 867. 
313. /d. at 867-68. 
314. /d. at 868. 
315. See id. at 867-69. 
316. /d. at 869. 
317. /d. 
318. !d. at 880 (Davis, J., concurring). 
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actions were a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries."319 Regard-
less of whether one agrees or disagrees with his conclusion that the plain-
tiffs failed to allege facts that could establish that the defendant's actions 
were a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries, Judge Davis ap-
propriately separated whether the plaintiffs had proved standing causation 
and the overall standing decision from whether the plaintiffs had proved 
proximate causation on the merits.320 
C. The En Bane Fifth Circuit Vacates the Panel Decision 
With a bare minimum quorum of nine judges, the Fifth Circuit voted 
to rehear the Comer case en banc.321 In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that an additional seven members of the court had recused themselves and 
did not participate in the decision to grant en bane review.322 According to 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, federal courts of ap-
peals should only grant en bane review in rare circumstances where a deci-
sion undermines the unity of the circuit's prior de~isions or a case has "ex-
ceptional" significance.323 According to a report by the Federal Bar Council 
for the Second Circuit: 
[I]n the 11-year period from 2000 through 2010, the twelve regional circuits heard 
a total of more than 325,000 cases that were terminated on the merits after oral 
hearings or submissions on briefs. A total of 667 (as reported) to 670 cases (using 
our Second Circuit data) were heard en bane during that same 11-year period-a 
little over 2110 of 1% of the totat.324 
The report also observed, "Notably, it appears that one overall trend in 
the circuit courts is a decline in en bane hearings-in both absolute and rela-
tive terms-although the numbers are sufficiently small that it is hard to tell 
if the trend is truly significant."325 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision to grant 
en bane review in Comer indicated that the Court believed that the case was 
exceptional or threatened the unity of the Circuit's law on standing, or per-
haps both. 
319. /d. 
320. See id. 
321. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 
607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
322. /d. at 210 n.l. 
323. FED. R. APP. P. 35. Rule 35 states: "An en bane hearing or rehearing is not fa-
vored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en bane consideration is necessary to 
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a ques-
tion of exceptional importance." /d. 
324. FED. BAR COUNCIL SECOND CIR. COURTS COMM., EN BANC PRACTICES lN THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT: TIME FOR A CHANGE? 4 (July 2011 ), available at 
http://www .federalbarcouncil.org/vg/custom/uploads/pdfs!En _Bane_ Report. pdf. 
325. /d. at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
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After the Fifth Circuit granted en bane review, the Comer case took a 
bizarre turn. The Fifth Circuit explained: 
After the en bane court was properly constituted, new circumstances arose that 
caused the disqualification and recusal of one of the nine judges, leaving only eight 
judges in regular active service, on a court of sixteen judges, who are not disquali-
fied in this en bane case. Upon this recusal, this en bane court lost its quorum. Ab-
sent a quorum, no court is authorized to transact judicial business.326 
The Fifth Circuit declined to appoint a judge from another circuit 
court of appeals to allow it to meet its quorum requirements or to waive its 
quorum rule, and, therefore, the court declared that it had no authority to 
hear the appeal from the district court.327 Because Fifth Circuit rules state 
that a panel decision is vacated as soon as there is a grant of rehearing en 
bane in the case, the court declared that it could not reinstate the panel deci-
sion.328 Furthermore, the court declined to hold the case in abeyance until a 
time in the indefinite future when it might have a quorum. 329 The court dis-
missed the appeal, and thus the decision of the district court stood as the 
only legitimate judgment in the case.330 
Judge Davis, who was joined by Judge Stewart, dissented from the or-
der dismissing the appeal; both had served on the three-judge panel whose 
decision had been vacated.331 Judge Davis argued that the Fifth Circuit's 
rule of vacating the panel decision when it grants en bane review made no 
sense when applied "in this situation where the court, after voting a case en 
bane, loses its quorum and the en bane court never considers the appeal on 
its merits."332 He argued that the court should appoint a judge from another 
circuit to avoid denying the plaintiffs their right to an appeal. 333 
Judge Dennis, the third member of the three-judge panel whose deci-
sion had been vacated by the five-judge majority of the Fifth Circuit decid-
ing the case,334 filed a separate dissenting opinion.335 Using stronger lan-
guage than Judge Davis, Judge Dennis condemned the majority for its 
"shockingly unwarranted actions of ruling that the panel decision has been 
326. Comer, 607 F.3d at I 053-54. 
327. See id. at 1054-55. 
328. !d. at I 053-55. 
329. !d. at I 054. 
330. See id. at I055. 
331. !d. at 1055-56 (Davis, J., dissenting); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 
859 (5th Cir. 2009) (listing Judges Davis and Stewart as members of the three-judge panel), 
reh 'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d I049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en 
bane). 
332. Comer, 607 F.3d at 1055. 
333. !d. at I 056. 
334. Comer, 585 F.3d at 859 (listing Judge Dennis as member of the three-judge 
panel). 
335. Comer, 607 F.3d at 1056-66. 
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irrevocably vacated and dismissing the appeal without adjudicating its mer-
its."336 He argued that the court could fulfill its "absolute duty" to hear an 
appeal in the case by either (1) interpreting its rules to conclude that it had a 
quorum to hear the case; (2) assigning a judge from another circuit to join 
the court; or (3) holding the case over until it had a quorum.337 
The five-judge majority of the eight judges hearing the case noted that 
the parties had the right to petition the Supreme Court.338 The plaintiffs 
chose not to file a petition for a writ of certiorari as to the merits of their 
appeal, but they instead filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the 
Supreme Court to order the Fifth Circuit to reinstate their appeal.339 On Jan-
uary 10, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition.340 
D. The District Court Denies Standing Again 
In 2011, the plaintiffs, including Ned Comer as lead plaintiff, filed a 
new complaint and then an amended complaint against numerous oil com-
panies, coal companies, electric companies, and chemical companies alleg-
ing public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence state law claims 
against the defendants. 341 They also sought a declaratory judgment that their 
state law tort claims arising from the defendants' emissions were not 
preempted by federal law, and they requested that the district court grant 
them a class designation.342 As in the previous round of litigation, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendants had harmed their property because the de-
fendants' significant GHG emissions exacerbated global warming which in 
tum worsened the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the plaintiffs' property.343 
The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for the harms 
allegedly caused by the defendants' conduct.344 
The defendants filed four separate but similar motions to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 
12(b)(6).345 The motions addressed several grounds including: (1) res judica-
ta and collateral estoppel; (2) standing; (3) the political question doctrine; 
336. !d. at 1056. 
337. !d. at 1056-66. 
338. !d. at 1055 (majority opinion). 
339. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (S.D. Miss. 2012). 
340. /d. (citing In re Ned Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902, 902 (2011)). 
341. /d. at 853-54. Filed before the AEP decision, the plaintiffs' complaint focused on 
state law claims and avoided federal common law claims. Brown & Miksad, supra note 26, 
at 8. 
342. 
343. 
344. 
345. 
Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
/d. 
/d. 
/d. at 854-55. 
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(4) preemption; (5) statute of limitations; and (6) proximate causation.346 
This Article will address only the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing.347 
The district court observed that traceable causation was the only ele-
ment of standing at issue in the Comer case.348 The Comer plaintiffs relied 
upon a test used in some Clean Water Act (CWA) cases to argue that they 
need only prove that "the defendants' emissions contributed to the kinds of 
injuries that they suffered."349 The district court observed that the plaintiffs' 
"contribution" argument was derived from the Third Circuit's Powell 
Duffiyn decision350 and the Fifth Circuit's partial endorsement of that test 
depending upon the circumstances in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown 
Central Petroleum Corp. 351 
The district court reasoned that the Powell Duffiyn "contribution" test 
was inapplicable to global warming cases because the Fifth Circuit in 
Crown Central had already "held that the Powell Duffiyn test may not be 
useful in cases where the waterway at issue is very large."352 In Crown Cen-
tral, the Fifth Circuit had questioned the appropriateness of the contribution 
test for plaintiffs who "utilized a lake that was eighteen miles downstream 
from the location of the defendant's discharge."353 Furthermore, the district 
court observed that Northern District of California in Kivalina had rejected 
the plaintiffs' proposed use of the Powell Duffiyn test for contribution in 
global climate change cases.354 
While the EPA had found that GHG emissions contribute to global 
warming in general, the district court in Comer concluded that such general 
causation findings failed to address the requirement that the plaintiffs 
demonstrate that the Comer defendants' emissions worsened Hurricane 
Katrina and therefore that the damages to the plaintiffs' property from the 
Hurricane are traceable to the defendants' actions.355 The district court rea-
soned that causation in global warming cases was far more complex and 
required better evidence of causation than the far more simple CW A cases 
346. !d. at 855-68. 
347. !d. at 857-62. The other issues are discussed in Brown & Miksad, supra note 26, 
at 8-9. 
348. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 858. 
349. /d. at 859. 
350. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
72 (3d Cir. 1990). 
351. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (quoting 95 F.3d 358, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
352. !d. (citing Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361). 
353. /d. (citing Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361). 
354. See id. at 860 (discussing Native Viii. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863, 877-80 (N.D. Cal. 2009), ajf'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), petition for en 
bane review denied (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012)). 
355. /d. at 860-61. 
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cited by the plaintiffs.356 Although Crown Ceillral involved a motion for 
summary judgment and Comer involved a motion to dismiss where more 
lenience is applied to the elements of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district 
court in Comer concluded that "the alleged chain of causation in the present 
case, is by far and away, more tenuous than the causal chain alleged in the 
Crown Central.m51 
Because the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases applied '"special 
solicitude"' to the standing rights of states, the district court in Comer con-
cluded that neither case supported the private plaintiffs in its case. 358 More 
questionably, the district court reasoned that the Massachusetts decision's 
finding of contribution in that case did not necessarily mean that the Comer 
plaintiffs could prove contribution.359 The district court stated: 
Although it is true that the Supreme Court determined that Massachusetts had 
standing based on the allegation that the EPA's failure to regulate merely contrib-
uted to Massachusetts' alleged injuries, this does not mean that the private citizen 
plaintiffs in the present case can demonstrate the causal connection standard by 
showing a mere contribution to similar injuries. If contribution were enough, pre-
sumably there would have been no need for the Supreme Court to grant Massachu-
setts special solicitude in its standing analysis.360 
The Massachusetts decision, however, was ambiguous about whether 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts needed "special solicitude" to meet 
the three-part standing test, including causation;361 it is possible that the 
Court obscured the issue because the five justices in the majority did not 
completely agree on whether the Commonwealth met traditional standing 
requirements.362 The district court's conclusion that the private plaintiffs' 
"showing a mere contribution to similar injuries"363 was not enough to prove 
a causal connection without the special solicitude given for state standing in 
Massachusetts is debatable because the Supreme Court has not provided a 
clear answer yet to the question of when private plaintiffs may have stand-
ing in global climate change cases. 364 
356. !d. at 861. 
357. !d. 
358. !d. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)). 
359. !d. 
360. !d. 
361. For example, one commentator argues that Massachusetts relaxed the injury 
standing requirement for the Commonwealth because of its status as a state, but not standing 
causation. See Nagle, supra note 43, at 496-97. But another commenter said that the Court 
arguably implied that the Commonwealth had met all three standing requirements, although 
its language was ambiguous. Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1730-34. 
362. See Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1730, 1733-34 (suggesting Massa-
chusetts majority may have obscured standing reasoning because the majority did not agree). 
363. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
364. See Mank, States Standing, supra note I, at 1730, 1733-34. 
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The district court was arguably on stronger ground when it reasoned 
that the Comer plaintiffs had a more difficult burden in proving traceable 
standing causation than the state plaintiffs in the Massachusetts and Con-
necticut cases because they must demonstrate that: 
[T]he defendants' emissions caused, or according to their arguments, contributed to 
a specific storm, Hurricane Katrina, and that their injuries would not have occurred 
if the defendants had not emitted greenhouse gases .... [P]Iaintitfs must show that 
the defendants' emissions caused or contributed to the specific damages they suf-
fered during Hurricane Katrina.365 
The court explained: 
[T]he plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate: "(I) what would the strength of 
Hurricane Katrina have been absent global warming; (2) how much of each Plain-
tiff's damages would have been attributable to Hurricane Katrina if it had come 
ashore at a lower strength; and (3) how much of each Plaintiff's damages was at-
tributable to failures by others, such as FEMA and other governmental agencies, to 
prevent additional injury."366 
The Comer district court was not persuaded by the vacated panel deci-
sion to change its views on standing, but the panel decision provided a bet-
ter analysis by appropriately distinguishing between standing causation and 
the decision on the merits. 367 The district court should have followed the 
reasoning of the panel decision that traceable standing causation requires 
less evidence than proximate causation on the merits.368 The panel's reason-
ing that the traceable standing causation requirement may be satisfied with 
less evidence than is necessary to prove proximate causation on the merits is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Bennett v. Spear, which 
stated that "proximate cause" of "[plaintiffs'] harm" is not equivalent with 
their "injury 'fairly traceable' to the defendant" for standing purposes.369 
Furthermore, the three-judge Comer panel decision conclusion that the 
plaintiffs had proven standing causation is bolstered by a footnote in the 
Massachusetts decision suggesting that Katrina may have been intensified 
by climate change.370 
365. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 861-62. 
366. /d. at 862 n.9 (quoting Defs.' Mem. Accompanying Mot. to Dismiss). 
367. See supra Section V.B (discussing panel decision). 
368. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009), reh 'g granted, 
598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
369. /d.; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997); see also Friends for Ferrell 
Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he 'fairly traceable' stand-
ard is 'not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation."' (quoting Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992))); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have never applied a 'tort' stand-
ard of causation to the question of traceability.")). 
370. Comer, 585 F.3d at 865-66 & nn.4-5. 
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The district court inappropriately implied that it dismissed the case for 
lack of standing at least in part to avoid imposing heavy discovery costs on 
the defendants in a case the court clearly saw as ultimately futile: 
As this Court stated in the first Comer lawsuit, the parties should not be permitted 
to engage in discovery that will likely cost millions of dollars, when the tenuous 
nature of the causation alleged is readily apparent at the pleadings stage of the liti-
gation. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not alleged injuries that are fairly 
traceable to the defendants' conduct, and thus, the plaintiffs do not have standing 
to pursue this lawsuit.371 
The Comer plaintiffs have appealed the district court's dismissal to the 
Fifth Circuit.372 
This Article contends that the district court should not have considered 
the potential costs of discovery in deciding to deny standin~73 because fed-
eral courts may limit discovery to avoid unnecessary burdens on defendants. 
For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires a 
federal district judge to limit discovery if "the burden or expense of the pro-
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."374 Citing Rule 26(b ), the D.C. 
Circuit has declared that "once a plaintiff has overcome a standing chal-
lenge under our famously liberal pleading rules he is not automatically enti-
tled to unlimited discovery.'ms Additionally, although a court pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( f) may issue a continuance for discovery 
where a party opposing a motion for summary judgment claims inability to 
'"present facts essential to justify its opposition,"' the D.C. Circuit has stat-
ed that Rule 56(f) does not "'require a trial judge to countenance repeated 
abuses of the discovery process or to let discovery go on indefinitely in a 
groundless suit. "'376 Moreover, because large U.S. emitters of GHGs are 
now required in most circumstances by the EPA to monitor and report their 
emissions, there is little reason for extensive discovery because the basic 
facts of a defendant's GHG emissions are already public record.377 The 
371. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
372. Brown & Miksad, supra note 26, at 9. 
373. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
374. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Additionally, a federal district court may issue a 
protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) limiting or forbidding discovery "for good cause ... 
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
375. Tooley v. Napolitano, 556 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed on other grounds 
on reh'g, 586 F.3d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
376. !d. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Donofrio v. Camp, 470 F.2d 428, 431-32 
(D.C. Cir.1972)). 
377. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) 
(requiring "reporting of greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors of the economy"); Green-
house Gas Reporting Program, EPA.GOV (last updated Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.htrnl (providing access to the 
latest EPA GHG reporting requirements). 
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fraud claims by the Comer plaintiffs might have required extensive discov-
ery to verify the plaintiffs' allegations, but those claims were dismissed by 
the three-judge panel for prudential standing reasons because the claims 
constituted generalized grievances concerning the alleged misleading of 
numerous public officials.378 Courts should not distort the standing doctrine 
to dismiss a case when it is more appropriate to limit discovery. 
VI. HOW COURTS SHOULD DECIDE STANDING FOR PRIVATE CLIMATE 
CHANGE PLAINTIFFS 
Because the Supreme Court has explained that standing is a prelimi-
nary decision that should be resolved separately from the merits of the case, 
courts should liberally recognize standing in private climate change cases 
even if they are likely to rule against the plaintiffs on the merits.379 Further-
more, as both the three-judge panel in Comer and the Supreme Court's Ben-
nett decision concluded, there is a lower threshold for standing causation 
than for proximate causation on the merits.380 The desire of defendants for 
an efficient resolution of their case is not an appropriate basis for a court to 
distort the doctrine of standing even if the judge believes that the plaintiffs 
will be ultimately unsuccessful on the merits.381 Because both standing and 
merits questions in climate change cases are complex, it is better to address 
standing and the merits separately. Standing issues should be decided first, 
especially because standing causation issues usually require less evidence 
since there is a lower threshold for standing causation than for proximate 
causation on the merits. 382 
This Article proposes, in Sections VI.C and VI.D, criteria for address-
ing when it is appropriate to recognize standing for private parties filing 
suits involving climate change challenges.383 If a state plaintiff has articulat-
ed similar claims, the Massachusetts decision arguably suggests that suits 
by sovereign states should enjoy priority over duplicative private claims 
because states enjoy a unique position in our federalist system of govern-
ment.384 That is especially true if the plaintiffs are seeking overlapping or 
duplicative injunctive relief.385 On the other hand, if plaintiffs like the Com-
ers have alleged unique injuries that no state plaintiff has asserted, then 
378. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 861, 867-69 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g 
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
379. See infra Sections VI.A-B. 
380. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997); Comer, 585 F.3d at 864; 
infra Section VI.B. 
381. See Comer, 585 F.3d at 864. 
382. See id.; infra Section VI.B. 
383. See infra Sections VI.C-D. 
384. See infra Section VI.C. 
385. See infra Section VI. C. 
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standing is presumptively appropriate, especially if the plaintiff is seeking 
individualized damages in a state common law nuisance action.386 The pro-
posed approach by this Article suggests that the private plaintiffs in the AEP 
decision were not entitled to standing because they sought duplicative in-
junctive relief also sought by state plaintiffs, but that the Comer plaintiffs 
should be able to prove standing at least for any plausible state common law 
damage claims. 387 
A. Courts Should Treat Standing Issues Separately from the Merits 
It is important to distinguish between the analysis of whether private 
plaintiffs in climate change cases should be entitled to Article III standing 
and whether they should prevail on the merits. Courts should apply a rela-
tively liberal approach in deciding standing issues for private plaintiffs pur-
suing climate change suits even if courts conclude that it is inappropriate to 
grant relief on the merits to those same plaintiffs because standing is a pre-
liminary question that should be treated separately from decisions on the 
merits.388 The desire of defendants for an efficient resolution of their case is 
not an appropriate basis for a court to distort the doctrine of standing. This 
is true even if the judge believes that the plaintiffs will be ultimately unsuc-
cessful on the merits, because it is usually better for the judiciary to decide 
the three-part test for standing before deciding the merits of the case, which 
involve different judicial tests. 389 
A full discussion of whether courts should grant relief on the merits in 
climate change cases is beyond the scope of this Article. In some circum-
stances, the Restatement (Third) of Torts allows plaintiffs to sue multiple 
tortfeasors jointly and severally if the harm is single and indivisible.390 Even 
if the harm of GHGs and climate change is conceived as a single and indi-
visible harm, however, there are serious problems with climate change suits 
because most potential defendants cannot be sued in U.S. courts.391 Some 
scholars argue that climate change tort suits are the only means to achieve 
just compensation for those harmed by climate change even if tort law must 
expand or change beyond its traditional boundaries.392 By contrast, other 
386. See infra Section VI.D. 
387. See infra Section VI.D. 
388. See infra Section VI.A. 
389. See infra Sections VI.A-B. 
390. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § Al8 (2000); Car-
rie Scrufari, Down the Rabbit-Hole of Standing: Injury, Traceability, and Redress in Green-
house Gas Litigation, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REv. 95, 119-20 (2011 ). 
391. See Scrufari, supra note 390, at 120-21. 
392. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Move-
ment: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197 (201 0); Douglas A. Kysar, 
What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. I (20 II). 
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commentators argue that climate change suits involve too many parties to be 
practicable for judicial resolution or expand tort or public nuisance liability 
too far beyond traditional common law boundaries.393 On the other hand, 
Benjamin Ewing and Douglas A. Kysar acknowledge that climate suits are 
novel tort actions, but argue that federal courts should allow such suits be-
cause these actions can act as "prods and pleas" to encourage the political 
branches to address important social issues that they might otherwise avoid 
confronting.394 It is understandable that a federal judge might wish to avoid 
the complex merit issues involved in a climate suit by dismissing a case for 
lack of standing or based on the political question doctrine, but courts 
should strictly separate standing issues from the merits to avoid mischarac-
terizing standing law as a means to avoid merit questions. 
Because standing is a preliminary question that should be treated sepa-
rately from decisions on the merits, federal courts should avoid using dis-
missals based on standing as a subterfuge to avoid difficult merit questions. 
In the seminal 1970 standing case, Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the Supreme Court recognized that standing is 
a preliminary issue that courts should separate from whether a plaintiff is 
likely to succeed on the merits.395 Prior to the Data Processing decision, the 
Court in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority396 had 
denied plaintiffs standing to sue "unless the right invaded is a legal right,-
one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious 
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."397 Thus, the 
legal interest test somewhat confusingly combined both common law and 
statutory bases for suit.398 Before the Data Processing decision, federal 
courts often engaged in lengthy analysis of statutory provisions to determine 
393. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the 
Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 317 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/12/06/epstein.htrnl; Donald G. 
Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian) Explanation for the 
Supreme Court's Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available 
at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac _pubs/1194/; Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public 
Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. (2011), available at http://www.Iaw.harvard.edu/programs/ 
about/privatelaw/is.pub.nuisance.tort.merrill.pdf. 
394. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Govern-
ment in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). But see Epstein, supra note 
393. 
395. 397 U.S. 150, 151-53 ( 1970); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984) (arguing Data Processing separated standing from merits). 
396. 306 u. s. 118 (1939). 
397. !d. at 137-38. 
398. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 226-27 
(1988); Peter M. Seka, Note, Federal Jurisdiction-The Second Circuit's Competitive Advo-
cate Standing Theory: Public or Private Model Theory? A Call for Choice, 14 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REv. 185, 191-92 (1992). 
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if a plaintiff met the legal interest standing test, especially in cases where 
the plaintiff was alleging competitive injury in violation of a federal statute 
and there was no obvious common law basis for a lawsuit.399 
The Court in Data Processing rejected prior cases requiring plaintiffs 
to demonstrate a "legal interest" because the "test goes to the merits."400 The 
Data Processing decision sharply distinguished between the preliminary 
question of standing and the ultimate decision on the merits, stating that 
"[t]he question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 
'controversy' test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected 
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. "401 As an 
example, the Data Processing opinion cited "the Administrative Procedure 
Act grant[ing] standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute. "'402 The Data Processing decision concluded 
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue while leaving it to the lower courts to 
decide whether they could prevail on the merits.403 The Data Processing 
opinion clearly established the principle that standing is a separate question 
from the merits.404 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have similarly distinguished be- . 
tween the threshold issue of standing and decisions on the merits.405 In Ben-
nett, the Court distinguished between standing causation "injury 'fairly 
traceable' to the defendant" and "injury as to which the defendant's actions 
are the very last step in the chain of causation."406 Accordingly, federal 
courts are bound by precedent to decide whether climate change plaintiffs 
have standing before deciding whether they can prevail on the merits. Anal-
ogously, because a court deciding a motion to dismiss '"must assume all the 
allegations of the complaint are true"' and "'must give the plaintiff the ben-
efit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged, "'407 the Su-
preme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly distinguished between the 
399. See Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing 
Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447,449-50 (1983). 
400. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
401. !d. 
402. !d. at 153-54 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)). 
403. !d. at 158 ("We hold that petitioners have standing to sue and that the case 
should be remanded for a hearing on the merits."). 
404. !d. at 152-54, 158. 
405. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("[S]tanding in no way depends on 
the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal .... "); Meier, supra 
note 9, at 1267 ("The Court has consistently reiterated that standing is a determination that is 
separate from the merits of a dispute .... "). 
406. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997). 
407. Tooley v. Napolitano, 556 F.3d 836, 839 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Aktieselskabet AF 
21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), dismissed on other 
grounds on reh 'g, 586 F.3d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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pleadings stage and the merits when it stated that a court should deny a mo-
tion to dismiss if a plaintiff presents "'plausible"' allegations, "'even if it 
strikes a savvy judge that ... recovery is very remote and unlikely. "'408 
Similarly, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Su-
preme Court rejected the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction" employed 
by some lower courts in which they "assumed" that they had jurisdiction so 
that they could decide the merits without having to decide standing or other 
jurisdictional issues. 409 The Court stated, "We decline to endorse such an 
approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judi-
cial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of pow-
ers."410 If a court decides the merits without deciding jurisdiction, the Court 
reasoned that such a decision can be criticized as merely an advisory deci-
sion because it is uncertain whether the court has the jurisdiction and hence 
the authority to render a binding judgment.411 Following the logic of Steel 
Co., a court should decide whether it has jurisdiction before it decides the 
merits of a case because a court should not even consider the merits until it 
is sure that it has the jurisdiction and hence the authority to decide the mer-
its.412 
B. Traceable Standing Causation Is Less than Proximate Causation 
The Comer panel reasoned that the traceable causation requirement for 
Article III standing "'need not be as close as the proximate causation need-
ed to succeed on the merits of a tort claim. Rather, an indirect causal rela-
tionship will suffice, so long as there is a fairly traceable connection be-
tween the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defend-
ant. "'413 The panel's reasoning that the traceable standing causation re-
quirement may be satisfied with less evidence than is necessary to prove 
proximate causation on the merits follows the Supreme Court's precedent in 
Bennett, which stated that the "'proximate cause'" of "[plaintiffs'] 'harm"' 
408. /d. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
409. 523 u.s. 83,93-102 (1998). 
410. !d. at 94. 
411. /d. at 101-02. 
412. See id. at 93-102; Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid 
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85-87 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning in light of Steel Co. that a 
district court should not make a "definitive ruling on the merits" without first deciding 
whether it has Article III standing); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing based on Steel 
Co. that the court must decide jurisdiction before proceeding to merits of case), rev'd on 
other grounds, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Meier, supra note 9, at 1267-69 (arguing that "standing 
must be decided at the outset of litigation"). 
413. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Toll 
Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009)), reh'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 
(5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
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is not equivalent with the "'injury "fairly traceable" to the defendant"' for 
standing purposes.414 In Bennett, the government defendant argued that the 
petitioners had to prove proximate causation to prove traceable causation, 
but the Court rejected that argument by stating, "This wrongly equates inju-
ry 'fairly traceable' to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's 
actions are the very last step in the chain of causation."415 
Standing causation should be treated as separate from tort causation on 
the merits. Analogously, in common law tort cases, courts distinguish be-
tween two different types of causation:416 first, the trier of fact decides if 
there is a preliminary cause in fact relationship between a defendant's con-
duct and the plaintiff's alleged harm, which establishes a factual cause of 
harm that is necessary but not sufficient to prove legalliability,417 and, sec-
ond, the court makes an ultimate proximate causation legal determination as 
to whether the factual relationship is sufficient to impose legal liability.418 
Professor Sperino observes that there are four concerns with how courts 
make proximate cause decisions that raise questions about whether such 
principles should be applied to areas other than tort liability, such as federal 
statutory interpretation issues involving causation: first, courts have applied 
conflicting rationales in deciding proximate causation issues; second, 
courts' proximate causation decisions are ultimately normative judgments 
about liability limits rather than decisions that turn on whether a defendant 
is the factual cause of an injury; third, "the goals of proximate cause have 
evolved over time and are still evolving" as social and judicial values 
change; and, fourth, courts apply different proximate causation judgments in 
414. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997) (internal citations 
omitted)); see also Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 
2002) ("[T]he 'fairly traceable' standard is 'not equivalent to a requirement of tort causa-
tion."' (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 
1992)); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301,308 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
("[W]e have never applied a 'tort' standard of causation to the question of traceability."). But 
see Meier, supra note 9, at 1245-46, 1297-99 (arguing that "the Court should reformulate the 
causation prong of standing to clarify that standing requires a proximate cause, rather than a 
cause in fact, analysis" so that standing law can serve a gatekeeping function). 
415. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168-69; Meier, supra note 9, at 1263-64 ("The Court reject-
ed the proximate cause argument of the Service because the plaintiffs had, in the Court's 
mind, satisfied the cause in fact analysis .... "). 
416. While the distinction in common law between cause-in-fact and proximate cau-
sation is genuine, one must acknowledge that courts have frequently failed to maintain clear 
distinctions between these two concepts. See Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact 
and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941, 945 (2001); Sandra 
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2013). 
417. "Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred 
absent the conduct." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM§ 26 (2010). 
418. Sperino, supra note 416. 
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intentional tort cases than they do in non-intentional cases, so one must be 
careful not to apply, for instance, a proximate cause approach suited to neg-
ligence issues to an intentional tort situation.419 Accordingly, there is a good 
argument that proximate causation is a vague standard that involves too 
much discretionary judgment by a judge regarding whether it is equitable 
for courts to impose liability on a defendant in a particular case and, there-
fore, that courts in making standing decisions should simply examine 
whether there is a plausible cause-in-fact relationship between the plaintiff's 
alleged injuries and the defendant's actions.420 Even Professor Meier, who 
advocates that federal courts use proximate causation as a standing test to 
serve a "gatekeeping function,"421 acknowledges that there are conflicting 
views on how to define proximate causation: 
There are a multitude of tests for determining whether proximate cause exists, with 
most jurisdictions having now settled on either the foreseeability test or the scope 
of the risk test. Complicating matters even further is that often the same term has 
been used to refer to both the cause in fact and proximate cause concepts.422 
Professor Meier argues that standing causation should be decided on 
the basis of a proximate causation analysis imported from tort law.423 He 
contends that "proximate causation" analysis on the merits requires less 
intensive fact finding than the separate tort element of "cause in fact" analy-
sis, which he argues that the Supreme Court has often implicitly used in past 
standing cases.424 Anticipating the objection that his proposed proximate 
cause standing test "would be inconsistent with the idea that the standing 
analysis can be conducted as separate from the merits of the case," Profes-
sor Meier argues that the Court's current cause in fact approach sometimes 
419. /d. 
420. See Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1505, 1544 (2008) (arguing that proximate cause is "an intellectual quagmire" and that it 
should not be imported into an Article III standing analysis because it would allow a court to 
inject its belief about what is "fair or not fair"). See generally Sperino, supra note 416 ("De-
fining proximate cause is notoriously tricky .... [T]he underlying goals of proximate cause 
are multiple, contested, and evolving. The use of proximate cause varies across tort actions, 
and many of proximate cause's underlying concerns relate to policy concerns."). 
421. See Meier, supra note 9, at 1245, 1265-69, 1278-82. 
422. /d. at 1252 (citations omitted). Professor Meier proposes that federal courts use 
"foreseeability analysis" as a "new interpretation of the fairly traceable prong of standing." 
/d. at 1278-79. 
423. !d. at 1245, 1297-99. 
424. See id. at 1245-46, 1252-53, 1259-60, 1297-99. In tort law, "cause in fact" and 
"proximate cause" are treated as separate elements of a standard negligence cause of action, 
although Professor Meier concedes that "tort law has been much less successful, however, in 
coalescing around an established vocabulary for the concepts involved." See id. at 1244, 
1251; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. 
a (2010) (explaining that cause in fact and proximate cause address "two quite distinct con-
cepts" despite their common "causal terminology"). 
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addresses the merits of the case.425 However, if it is true, as Professor Meier 
claims, that federal courts sometimes inappropriately look to the merits 
when deciding standing issues, this Article's approach would better solve 
the problem by clearly establishing that standing causation is a preliminary 
decision separate from the merits than Professor Meier's proposal to merge 
standing and the merits into one decision. He acknowledges that "[s]ome 
reconfiguring of standing doctrine would be needed to avoid repetitive and 
duplicate analyses" between standing causation and merits causation,426 but 
this Article's approach would avoid the need for such reconfiguring by 
keeping standing and merit causation totally separate. He makes a good 
point in observing that "the Court could not have picked a more ambivalent 
phrase than 'fairly traceable' in terms of obscuring the two different types 
of analyses that are commonly associated with the term 'causation. "'427 This 
Article agrees with Professor Meier that the term "fairly traceable" standing 
causation needs to be clarified, but rejects importing proximate causation 
terminology to do so. 
Professor Meier also suggests that his proximate causation standing 
proposal would serve a "limited purpose" within the broader context of sep-
aration of powers concerns that ask "whether the body that created the sub-
stantive law relied on by the plaintiff (usually a state legislature or Con-
gress) intended for the law to be used in the manner that the plaintiff seeks 
to use it."428 But, he also acknowledges that "[t]he proximate cause under-
standing could not, however, further all of the separation of powers con-
cepts represented by standing law."429 Because of the complexities of both 
the separation of powers and proximate cause doctrines, it is not clear how 
he would meld the two concepts into an operational standing test.430 To the 
contrary, because they are courts of limited jurisdiction limited by the 
"'Cases"' and "'Controversies"' requirement in Article III, federal courts 
should not even consider the merits until it is clear that the plaintiff has 
standing, as the Court held in Steel Co. when it rejected the doctrine of hy-
pothetical jurisdiction.431 
By contrast to Professor Meier's proposed proximate causation stand-
ing test, this Article proposes, in accord with the panel decision in Comer, 
treating all standing causation issues as preliminary questions that require 
only plausible evidence of a link between the defendant's conduct and the 
425. Meier, supra note 9, at 1298. 
426. /d. 
427. /d. at 1253. 
428. /d. at 1298. 
429. /d. 
430. See id. at 1298-99. 
431. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 98, I 02 (1998) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
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alleged harm to the plaintiff, instead of the more intensive factual and causal 
analysis required for the merits of the case. Professor Meier acknowledges 
that the Court continues to employ cause in fact language in its standing 
opinions because of "a desire to completely divorce the causation inquiry 
from the merits of the case."432 Furthermore, he concedes that the Court 
often "dodge[s] the difficulties that arise in conducting this fact-intensive 
analysis at the outset of litigation by employing various techniques that es-
sentially emasculate the cause in fact analysis."433 Thus, the proposed ap-
proach of this Article to limit the scope of the analysis in determining stand-
ing causation and to explicitly divorce standing causation and the merits is 
consistent with the Court's actual practice, whereas Professor Meier's prox-
imate causation proposal would require more of a change in its existing 
approach, requiring a more in-depth analysis of causation than it typically 
employs.434 For example, Professor Meier points out that the Court in Mas-
sachusetts avoided in-depth analysis of standing causation by reasoning that 
the EPA had stipulated that GHGs cause climate change and that this pat-
tern of avoidance "clearly reflects a hesitancy to engage in a full-fledged 
cause in fact analysis as part of the threshold inquiry of standing."435 This 
Article's proposal for a limited standing causation inquiry is consistent with 
Massachusetts's "hesitancy" to engage in the intensive gatekeeping causa-
tion analysis that Professor Meier prefers.436 
As opposed to Professor Meier's approach of importing tort concepts 
such as proximate causation into standing causation,437 this Article would 
clarify the Court's existing approach to standing causation by explicitly 
treating the traceable causation test as a separate and preliminary test dis-
tinct from determining tort causation on the merits, because courts should 
not duplicate causation analysis on the merits when they make the prelimi-
nary decision to decide standing.438 For example, a court might determine 
that the Comer plaintiffs' allegations of a link between the GHG emissions 
of the numerous defendants and the potential exacerbation of Hurricane 
Katrina from such GHG emissions presented a plausible theory sufficient to 
prove standing causation while waiting until the merit stage to decide if the 
plaintiffs can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely 
432. Meier, supra note 9, at 1286-87. 
433. /d. at 1287; see also id. at 1287-96. 
434. See generally id. at 1286-96 (discussing the Court's avowed cause in fact stand-
ing test and how it avoids engaging in meaningful factual analysis). 
435. /d. at 1296-97. 
436. /d. at 1296-99 (proposing that federal courts use proximate causation as gate-
keeping test to limit Article III jurisdiction). 
437. !d. at 1297. 
438. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855,864-65 (5th Cir. 2009), reh"g grant-
ed, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2009); see supra see 
supra notes 405-19 and accompanying text. 
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than not that the defendants' actions worsened the impact of the Hurri-
cane.439 Professor Meier argues that federal courts should serve as "gate-
keeper[s]" who set a standing bar for plaintiffs.440 By contrast, this Article 
seeks to set a lower standing threshold that would still reject duplicative or 
implausible suits.441 
C. Federalist Principles Suggest Courts Favor State Plaintiffs over Private 
Plaintiffs in Injunctive Cases 
If a state plaintiff has articulated similar claims, it is more efficient 
and consistent with federalist principles in the Massachusetts decision for 
federal courts to favor suits by sovereign states over duplicative private 
claims because states have a unique role in our federalist system of govern-
ment in protecting the health of their citizens and the natural resources in 
that state. 442 Because of the separation of powers concerns raised by injunc-
tive relief, courts should interpret Massachusetts's special solicitude for 
state standing to limit injunctive remedies in climate change cases to states, 
but to allow private plaintiffs to collect individualized damages.443 The ar-
gument for limiting private remedies to damages is especially strong if pri-
vate and state plaintiffs are seeking overlapping or duplicative injunctive 
relief.444 Even Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, 
which criticized giving greater standing rights to states, conceded that Ten-
nessee Copper treated states more favorably than private litigants by giving 
Georgia the right to equitable relief when private litigants could obtain only 
a legal remedy, and, therefore, there is precedent for giving states a greater 
right to equitable relief.445 
In climate change cases, courts should reject private suits seeking du-
plicative or overlapping injunctive remedies and defer to state suits seeking 
439. Comer, 585 F.3d at 864-65; see supra Section IV.A. 
440. Meier, supra note 9, at 1245, 1265-69. 
441. See supra notes 405-32 and accompanying text; infra Section VI. D. 
442. See infra notes 435-45 and accompanying text. 
443. Scrufari, supra note 390, at 126-30 (arguing that injunctive relief in climate 
change cases raises separation of powers concerns while damages remedies are more judi-
cially acceptable); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nui-
sance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1838-43 (2008) (arguing that 
"[d]amages remedies represent a far less intrusive-and thus far less complex-method of 
climate change regulation" and can serve as judicial carbon tax). But see Jeremy Hessler, 
Note, A Temporary Solution to Climate Change: The Federal Common Law to the Rescue?, 
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 433-36 (2011) (arguing that, contrary to conventional as-
sumption that damages are preferable in climate change suits, injunctive remedies can be 
acceptable in such suits by using Hand tort formula to decide if Best Available Control 
Technology is practicable and efficient). 
444. See infra notes 438-43 and accompanying text. 
445. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 537-38 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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injunctive relief because states have a special place in our federalist system 
and are usually better representatives of the public interest. 446 In American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, both the states plaintiffs and land trust 
plaintiffs each sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant '"to cap its 
carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage 
each year for at least a decade. "'447 Let us suppose that the state plaintiffs 
and private plaintiffs had disagreed on the scope of injunctive relief and 
sought inconsistent remedies. Based on the Massachusetts decision's special 
solicitude standard for state standing, courts should give preference to the 
injunctive relief sought by sovereign states because they represent more 
people and broader territory than private individuals or even large public 
interest organizations. 448 
Even if a private group and a state represented the exact same number 
of persons, the Massachusetts decision recognized that states have a special 
position in our federalist system.449 Some scholars have argued that federal-
ist principles entitle states to greater standing rights to challenge generalized 
grievances even if other parties pursuing similar litigation would be barred 
by separation of powers principles,450 although other scholars would limit 
federalist standing doctrine to situations where a state is challenging federal 
regulation that preempts state law or otherwise harms its sovereign inter-
ests.451 Additionally, state attorneys general, who typically represent a state 
in its litigation, can better represent the public interest because they are usu-
446. !d. at 519-20 (majority opinion) (explaining the special status of states in our 
federalist government); Stevenson & Eckhart, supra note 205, at 45-47 (arguing that states 
deserved greater standing rights in Massachusetts because they are usually better representa-
tives of the public interest than private litigants). 
447. 131 S. Ct. 2527,2534 (2011) (quoting J.A. at 110). 
448. Stevenson & Eckhart, supra note 205, at 45-47 (arguing states deserved greater 
standing rights in Massachusetts because they represent more people and territory than pri-
vate litigants); see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (observing that "Massachusetts does 
in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affected' only reinforces the conclusion 
that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of 
federal judicial power."). 
449. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20 (explaining the special status of states in our 
federalist government); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (stating that 
"sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the 
original Constitution itself'). 
450. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 249, 253, 262, 273-84 (2009) ("This relaxation of the injury in fact requirement for 
parens patriae suits that seek to vindicate undifferentiated public rights advances federalism 
principles and does not violate the principle of separated powers. A foundational element of 
federalism is the diffusion of power between states and the federal government, with the 
prospect of the states acting as a check upon unlawful or unwarranted federal power."). 
451. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 54, at 1077-78, 1096-1103 (arguing that states 
should have relaxed standing if federal government injures the state's sovereign interests or 
preempts state law). 
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ally elected officials who represent a broad range of constituents. While 
they can be partisan because of their involvement in the political process, 
there is a reasonable argument that state attorneys general as the chief legal 
representative of their state should take precedence in seeking injunctive or 
class relief over private attorneys.452 Accordingly, federal courts should fol-
low the federalist principles in the Massachusetts decision by giving states 
priority in climate change suits over private plaintiffs seeking inconsistent 
injunctive relief. Nevertheless, in many cases, states would voluntarily col-
laborate with private groups in these suits.453 
D. Liberal Standing When Private Plaintiffs Seek Individualized Damages 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kivalina held that the CAA displaces 
federal common law actions for both injunctions and damages. 454 But the 
case leaves open the possibility of state common law claims. Judge Pro's 
concurring opinion explicitly observed that the Kivalina plaintiffs could 
pursue any state common law nuisance actions not preempted by federal 
law.455 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Silkwood held that even if a fed-
eral statute preempts state injunctive relief, it does not necessarily bar state 
common law claims for damages. 456 Thus, private parties might still be able 
to pursue state common law actions for damages against GHG emitters even 
if they cannot seek federal common law claims for damages and even if 
courts prefer to reserve injunctive remedies for state plaintiffs. 
If private plaintiffs like the Comers have alleged unique injuries that 
no state plaintiff has asserted, then standing may be appropriate if the alle-
gations are plausible, especially if the plaintiff is seeking individualized 
damages in a state common law action for injuries caused by climate 
change.457 Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kivalina holding that the 
CAA displaces federal common law actions for both injunctions and dam-
452. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1780-85 (discussing the advantages 
and disadvantages of state attorneys general representing their states in parens patriae suits); 
Stevenson & Eckhart, supra note 205, at 17 nn.86-87 (reporting that forty-three states elect 
their attorney general); id. at 45-46 (arguing that state attorneys general, especially if elected, 
have many advantages compared to private litigants in representing public interest in litiga-
tion). 
453. Stevenson & Eckhart, supra note 205, at 46. 
454. Native Viii. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 
2012), petition for en bane review denied (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012). 
455. /d. at 866 (Pro, J., concurring). 
456. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (concluding that 
federal statute preempted state injunctive remedies, but did not preempt state damage reme-
dies). 
457. Scrufari, supra note 390, at 98 ("The plaintiffs most likely to meet the standing 
requirements in greenhouse gas litigation cases are those who have directly suffered injuries 
and are seeking monetary compensation for those injuries."). 
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ages,458 Judge Pro's concurring opinion demonstrates that Silkwood leaves 
open the possibility of state common law claims for damages.459 Courts de-
cide standing separately for damages and injunctions because they are sepa-
rate forms of relief.460 Plaintiffs seeking individualized damages arguably 
should face lower standing barriers than those seeking injunctive relief, es-
pecially against the government, because injunctive relief raises greater 
separation of powers concerns by imposing structural and policy changes 
that, for example, Chief Justice Roberts in his Massachusetts dissent argued, 
should be decided by the political branches rather than the judiciary.461 Ac-
cordingly, in light of the separation of powers concerns raised by injunctive 
relief, courts should strongly consider interpreting Massachusetts's special 
solicitude to limit injunctive remedies in climate change cases to states, but 
possibly allow private plaintiffs to collect individualized damages if perti-
nent tort principles would support the award of damages to certain plain-
tiffs.462 In Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit observed, "Damage ac-
tions are particularly judicially manageable. By contrast, because the fram-
ing of injunctive relief may require the courts to engage in the type of op-
erational decision-making beyond their competence and constitutionally 
committed to other branches, such suits are far more likely to implicate po-
litical questions."463 Following the Ninth Circuit's approach in Koohi and 
the federalist implications of the Massachusetts decision, this Article sug-
gests that courts should deny standing for the private plaintiffs similar to 
those in the AEP decision because they sought duplicative injunctive relief 
also sought by state plaintiffs, but that the Comer plaintiffs possibly could 
prove standing for their state common law claims since they only sought 
damages for their individual injuries.464 
458. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. 
459. See supra Subsection IV.B.2. 
460. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief 
sought."); Scrufari, supra note 390, at 114-15. 
461. See Scrufari, supra note 390, at 126-30 (arguing Comer and Kivalina plaintiffs 
are more likely to have standing because they seek money damages, unlike injunction sought 
in AEP that raises separation of powers concerns); Zasloff, supra note 443, at 1839 ("Dam-
ages remedies represent a far less intrusive-and thus far less complex-method of climate 
change regulation [than injunctive remedies]."). See generally supra Subsection II.B.2 (dis-
cussing Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, arguing that climate 
change policy should be decided by the political branches). 
462. See Scrufari, supra note 390, at 126-30; Zasloff, supra note 443, at 1838-39. But 
see Hessler, supra note 443, at 433-36 (arguing that, contrary to conventional assumption 
that damages are preferable, injunctive remedies can be acceptable in climate change suits by 
using Hand tort formula to decide if remedy is practicable and efficient). 
463. 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992). 
464. See Scrufari, supra note 390, at 98, 126-30 (arguing courts should be more likely 
to rule in favor of plaintiffs seeking damages for alleged injuries from greenhouse gas emis-
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CONCLUSION 
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Data Processing and 
Steel Co., Section VI.A explains why federal courts should strictly separate 
preliminary standing questions from decisions on the merits.465 Furthermore, 
consistent with the Court's precedent in Bennett,466 Section VI.B clarifies 
the Court's existing approach to standing causation by explicitly treating the 
traceable causation test as a separate and preliminary test with a lower evi-
dentiary threshold distinct from determining tort causation on the merits; 
this is because courts should not duplicate causation analysis on the merits 
when they make the preliminary decision to decide standing.467 Thus, Sec-
tion VI.B rejects Professor Meier's approach of importing proximate causa-
tion into standing causation.468 Accordingly, federal judges should be open 
to recognizing standing in climate change cases even if they harbor serious 
doubts about whether they could prove their tort claims by a preponderance 
of the evidence, although they may limit discovery in such circumstances to 
avoid imposing unnecessary costs on defendants.469 
As Sections VI.C and VI.D explain, because ofthe separation ofpow-
ers concerns raised by injunctive relief, the special role of states in our fed-
eralist system, and the usually superior ability of state attorneys general to 
represent the public interest,470 courts should interpret Massachusetts's spe-
cial solicitude principle for state standing to limit injunctive remedies in 
climate change cases to states because they can better represent broad public 
interests, but allow private plaintiffs to collect individualized damages if 
they make plausible allegations of individualized tort harm in a state com-
mon law action.471 Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kivalina holding 
that the CAA displaces federal common law actions for both injunctions and 
sions causing global warming than plaintiffs seeking injunctive remedies that raise separation 
of powers concerns). 
465. See supra Section VI.A; Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 u.s. !50, 152-53, !58 (1970). 
466. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 
855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009), reh 'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 
1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
467. Comer, 585 F.3d at 864; see supra Section VI. B. 
468. See supra Section VI. B. 
469. See supra Sections VI. A-B. 
470. See supra Sections VI. C-O. 
471. See Scrufari, supra note 390, at 126-29; Zasloff, supra note 443, at 1839; supra 
Sections VI.C-0. But see Hessler, supra note 443, at 433-36 (arguing that, contrary to con-
ventional assumption that damages are preferable, injunctive remedies can be acceptable in 
climate change suits by using Hand tort formula to decide if remedy is practicable and effi-
cient). 
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damages,472 Judge Pro's concurring opinion demonstrates that Silkwood 
leaves open the possibility of state common law claims for damages.473 
Thus, private suits alleging individualized damages for state common law 
claims like those in Comer deserve serious consideration for meeting Arti-
cle III standing requirements as long as there is plausible evidence of causa-
tion.474 The proposed approach by this Article suggests that courts could 
deny standing for private plaintiffs similar to those in the AEP decision be-
cause they sought only duplicative injunctive relief better sought by state 
plaintiffs, but that plaintiffs like the Comer plaintiffs arguably should be 
able to prove standing for any plausible state common law claims for dam-
ages.475 
472. Native Viii. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 
2012),petitionfor en bane review denied (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012). 
473. See supra Subsection IV.B.2. 
474. See supra Section VI. D. 
475. See supra Section VI. D. 
